China’s Military Purges Raise Questions Over Its Ability To Wage War
China Removes Top Generals As Questions Grow Over Its Military Command
What China’s Purge Of Senior Generals Could Mean For Taiwan
The expulsion of two of China’s most senior military figures has sharpened scrutiny of the People’s Liberation Army’s command structure. Zhang Youxia, once regarded as a close ally of President Xi Jinping, and Liu Zhenli have been expelled from the Communist Party and the military following allegations of disloyalty and corruption. Their cases are to be referred to military prosecutors. The allegations are those of the Chinese authorities; an independent public account establishing their full basis is unavailable.
The immediate question is whether a force undergoing extensive leadership changes could execute a complex operation, particularly one involving Taiwan. Reuters reported on 23 September that five places remain vacant on the seven-member ruling committee of China’s Central Military Commission, the country’s top military command body. Analysts differ over how much that disruption affects readiness. China continues military exercises and weapons tests, while the loss of senior officers creates uncertainty about decision-making at the top.
Why These Two Removals Matter
Zhang served as vice-chairman of the Central Military Commission and was widely viewed as Xi’s closest military ally. Liu was a commission member and chief of staff of its Joint Staff Department. Investigations into both men were announced in January; their expulsion from the party and military was announced this week.
Zhang’s removal is especially consequential because he was among the senior Chinese officers with actual combat experience, having served during China’s 1979 border war with Vietnam. Experience of that conflict cannot be treated as a ready-made guide to a modern campaign. Its loss nevertheless adds to questions about who can challenge assumptions, weigh operational risks and give Xi candid advice before a major decision.
The charges also go beyond a straightforward accusation of financial misconduct. Chinese authorities have alleged that the two men formed factions and were disloyal to the party. Reuters quoted former CIA China analyst Dennis Wilder describing the prominence of those disloyalty allegations as an unusual escalation. That gives the purge a political dimension alongside the stated anti-corruption case.
A Stronger Grip Can Carry An Operational Cost
There is a clear argument for removing corrupt officers. Corruption in procurement or promotion can leave a military with unreliable equipment, distorted reporting and commanders selected for the wrong reasons. Tian Shichen, a former Chinese defence ministry official quoted by Reuters, argued that eliminating corrupt elements strengthens the armed forces’ cohesion and combat effectiveness.
The competing concern is the disruption caused by replacing many leaders in a short period. A senior command group must establish working relationships, pass information upwards and make decisions across services. Vacant posts do not mean every order stops moving: the PLA still has a joint staff, theatre commands and individual services. But a major operation would place far greater demands on those links than a routine exercise.
A defence assessment reported by Reuters earlier this year warned that the purges had created serious deficiencies in the PLA’s command structure and were likely to have hampered readiness in the short term. That is an assessment of organisational risk, not a public test proving how Chinese forces would perform in combat. Readiness cannot be measured from the number of empty chairs alone.
Why Taiwan Is Central To The Debate
A conflict over Taiwan would demand coordination on an exceptional scale. Leaders would need to manage decisions across air, naval, missile and other forces while responding to changing events and the possibility of outside intervention. Failures in communication, trust or reporting could matter greatly in such circumstances.
China claims Taiwan as its territory; Taiwan rejects Beijing’s sovereignty claim. Analysts cited by Reuters say the upheaval raises particular questions about the PLA’s ability to conduct a full-scale Taiwan operation. At the same time, they report that routine operations have continued despite the turmoil. Both points matter: continued exercises show the force is functioning, but they cannot settle how it would handle a far more demanding war.
Nor does a concern about readiness establish China’s intentions. A decision to use force would involve political calculations, perceptions of risk and circumstances that could change. It would be unsound to infer from these purges either that an attack is imminent or that Beijing has abandoned its objectives.
The Risk Of Hearing Only What A Leader Wants To Hear
The purges may strengthen Xi’s personal control while making frank advice harder to obtain. That is a concern raised by analysts, rather than a demonstrated account of conversations inside China’s leadership. Reuters reported that Zhang’s removal has also left uncertainty about who might take his place in senior military contacts with the United States.
The distinction between control and information is crucial. A leader can have authority to issue an order and still need subordinates willing to explain why a plan might fail. Equally, an anti-corruption drive could eventually improve reliability if it removes compromised officials and produces capable replacements. The near-term disruption and possible longer-term benefit can coexist.
China’s defence ministry did not immediately respond to Reuters’ request for comment on its latest analysis. An editorial in the official PLA Daily, cited by Reuters, asserted that Zhang and Liu had damaged military political development and combat effectiveness. That is the PLA’s stated position, rather than independent proof of the extent of the damage or of the charges against the men.
What To Watch Next
The clearest public indicators will be appointments to the vacant top posts, the experience of those appointed, the continuity of exercises and whether China restores dependable channels for military communication. None offers a complete window into classified planning, but together they may show whether the present upheaval is easing.
For now, the evidence supports a narrower conclusion than the most dramatic headlines suggest. Xi has consolidated control over an unsettled military leadership. Analysts have credible reasons to question the short-term effect on complex operations, while China’s forces continue to function and modernise. Whether the purge ultimately weakens the PLA or helps Xi build the force he wants remains an open question — one with particular importance around Taiwan.
