Reform Wants The Royal Navy To Stop The Small Boats

Reform wants Royal Navy to stop small boats: could it work?

Could It Actually Work?

Reform UK has now gone much further than simply calling for tougher action on Channel crossings.

The party has unveiled “Operation Fortress”, proposing a major military operation in the English Channel in which the Royal Navy and other Armed Forces would intercept small boats and prevent them reaching Britain. Reform says boats would be intercepted and people returned to France or Belgium, with Nigel Farage arguing that Britain should have an “impenetrable” maritime border.

It is an extraordinarily ambitious proposal.

But the central question is not whether the Royal Navy can physically intercept small boats.

It can.

The real questions are whether Britain is willing to give the military the authority, resources and rules of engagement required to do it — and whether the government can establish a workable system for what happens to the people intercepted.

Could the Royal Navy actually stop them?

Yes — at least in the basic physical sense.

Britain already demonstrated during Operation Isotrope in 2022 that the military could play a major role in controlling the Channel response.

At its peak, the operation involved a Royal Navy offshore patrol vessel, six P2000-class patrol vessels, RHIBs and a Wildcat helicopter, with around 180 personnel involved at any one time. By September 2022, 541 migrant vessels had been intercepted under the operation.

There is therefore nothing inherently impossible about putting British military vessels, aircraft, surveillance systems and personnel into the Channel.

In fact, the precedent is important for Reform's argument.

Britain has previously decided that the Channel crossing problem was serious enough to warrant military involvement.

The difference is what the military was actually allowed to do.

In 2022, the Royal Navy primarily performed coordination and monitoring functions, while specialist Border Force vessels carried out much of the physical interception and transfer of people.

And the government subsequently withdrew the turnaround policy. The Ministry of Defence explicitly stated that the Royal Navy would not implement or assist in turnaround tactics under Defence primacy.

That is the crucial distinction.

The question isn't whether Britain possesses the capability to find and intercept small boats. It is whether Britain is prepared to use that capability for a fundamentally different border policy.

So why hasn't it been done?

There are three major reasons.

1. Britain has prioritised French cooperation

Successive governments have attempted to solve the problem through cooperation with France rather than unilateral military enforcement.

The UK-France agreement now provides a mechanism for certain small-boat arrivals to be returned to France after reaching Britain. The government has also funded French enforcement and expanded joint efforts against smuggling gangs.

The Reform argument is essentially that this approach has not gone far enough.

And there is a reasonable political argument behind that.

If Britain is spending hundreds of millions of pounds trying to persuade another country to stop people reaching Britain, while boats continue to depart, why shouldn't Britain also be prepared to physically defend its own maritime border?

That is the strongest case for Reform's position.

2. The Navy has different priorities

The Royal Navy is not a giant Border Force.

Its principal purpose is national defence: protecting British territory, supporting NATO, securing maritime trade and dealing with military threats.

A modern destroyer or frigate is an extraordinarily expensive and sophisticated military asset. Using one as a floating immigration-control vessel would make little economic sense.

This is one of the legitimate criticisms of Reform's proposal.

The answer, however, doesn't necessarily have to be “therefore don't use the military.”

It could instead mean:

Use the military's surveillance, command, intelligence and maritime capabilities — but build the actual interception force around cheaper, purpose-built vessels.

That would be a much more credible version of Operation Fortress.

Reform itself says the proposal has been developed with input from senior and former members of the Armed Forces.

If that military expertise is translated into a properly designed force rather than simply putting expensive warships into the Channel, the proposal becomes considerably more plausible.

The biggest problem: France

This is where the debate gets genuinely difficult.

Stopping a boat in British territorial waters is one thing.

Putting people back onto French soil is another.

Britain cannot simply assume that a Royal Navy vessel can sail into French territorial waters and deposit people there without French cooperation.

That would create an enormous diplomatic confrontation.

This is why Reform's insistence that the policy can be implemented under international law is going to face its biggest test.

There are also obligations concerning people who are genuinely in distress at sea. International maritime rules require ships to assist people in distress and provide for coordinated search-and-rescue arrangements.

That doesn't mean Britain is powerless.

It means “intercept and return” cannot simply mean forcing an unsafe dinghy back into the Channel.

Any workable Reform policy would need to separate two things:

Border enforcement — stopping an unauthorised vessel from entering Britain.

Search and rescue — preventing people from drowning when a vessel is genuinely in distress.

Those objectives can coexist.

But the rules would need to be exceptionally clear.

Would it be effective?

Potentially — but not simply because the Royal Navy is bigger and more powerful.

The real weapon would be deterrence.

The small-boat model works because smugglers sell people a proposition:

Get into Britain and your chances of staying are high.

If that proposition changes to:

You will be intercepted before reaching Britain and will not be allowed to establish yourself here,

the economics of the crossing could change dramatically.

This is why Reform's broader immigration policy matters.

Zia Yusuf has previously said a Reform government would combine stopping the boats with increased deportations, new detention capacity and changes to the legal framework surrounding removals.

A naval operation by itself would therefore be incomplete.

Interception + immediate processing + reliable returns = deterrence.

Interception without a credible destination for those intercepted could simply create a floating immigration-processing system in the Channel.

The strongest argument for Reform

The strongest Reform argument is not really:

“Send Britain's biggest warships to chase dinghies.”

That is an easy target for critics.

The stronger argument is:

Britain should treat the Channel as a national border rather than simply a search-and-rescue problem.

The UK has already demonstrated that it can detect, monitor and intercept boats.

The state already possesses naval vessels, patrol craft, aircraft, helicopters, surveillance technology and intelligence capabilities.

And Britain has already legislated to give Border Force powers to stop and redirect vessels involved in irregular entry.

So the question becomes one of political will.

How much priority should the state give to physically preventing unauthorised entry?

Reform's answer is: a very high priority.

That is a legitimate policy choice.

But Reform needs to get the mechanics right

This is where the party should be challenged — even from a pro-Reform perspective.

It is not enough to announce a military operation and say the boats will stop.

A serious plan would need:

• Dedicated Channel patrol vessels, rather than relying primarily on expensive frontline warships.

• Continuous aerial surveillance using helicopters, aircraft, drones and radar.

• A unified command structure between the Navy, Border Force, Coastguard and immigration authorities.

• Clear rules of engagement designed to prevent dangerous collisions.

• Medical and rescue capabilities for genuine emergencies.

• A legally robust returns mechanism.

• A diplomatic agreement with France or another mechanism for receiving intercepted people.

• A credible deportation system once people reach Britain.

• A strategy against the smuggling gangs themselves.

That is much closer to what a successful “Fortress Britain” strategy would actually look like.

The uncomfortable lesson from 2022

There is an important historical point that strengthens Reform's argument — but also provides a warning.

Britain has already tried military involvement.

Operation Isotrope did not turn into a permanent naval blockade. Parliament's Defence Committee criticised the government's planning, warning about the impact on naval budgets, personnel and Britain's relationship with France.

But that does not prove that military involvement is impossible.

It proves that military involvement without a sufficiently clear political objective doesn't solve the problem.

Reform is effectively proposing a different objective:

Not merely manage crossings.

Prevent them from succeeding.

That is a much more aggressive policy.

Verdict: Could Reform's plan work?

Yes — but not exactly in the simplistic form critics are attacking.

The Royal Navy cannot magically make the Channel disappear.

It cannot ignore maritime safety rules.

It cannot simply assume France will accept people returned to its territory.

And sending billion-pound warships around the Channel indefinitely would be a poor use of defence resources.

But the underlying proposition — that Britain could deploy military-grade surveillance, command, patrol and interception capabilities to make the Channel far harder to cross — is absolutely feasible.

Britain has done versions of it before.

The real question is whether the government is prepared to make border prevention rather than post-arrival processing the central objective.

That is where Reform has a strong political argument.

If the policy is implemented as nothing more than a publicity stunt involving warships, it will fail.

If it becomes a properly funded maritime border force — backed by the Royal Navy, Border Force, RAF surveillance, intelligence operations, tougher returns and a workable agreement with France — it could significantly change the calculation for both migrants and the criminal gangs selling the crossings.

And that is ultimately the point Reform is making:

A country that can defend its coastline from hostile military vessels should also be capable of controlling who enters it by sea.

The difficult part is not finding the boats.

The difficult part is having the political will to stop them — and the legal and diplomatic machinery to make the stop permanent.