America Has Nearly Emptied a Critical Long-Range Missile Arsenal
The Pentagon’s Long-Range Missile Crisis Is Bigger Than Iran
The Iran War Has Exposed a Dangerous Missile Shortage
The United States has reportedly used “virtually all” of two of its most important ground-launched precision missile inventories during the five-month war with Iran. That does not mean the entire American long-range arsenal is empty, but it exposes a dangerous truth: modern war can consume the weapons needed for deterrence far faster than even the world’s largest military can replace them.
The warning concerns the Army Tactical Missile System, known as ATACMS, and the newer Precision Strike Missile, or PrSM. People familiar with internal supply data have not disclosed how many remain, leaving the exact depth of the shortage classified and unverified in public, but the reported scale is serious enough to raise questions about China, Russia, Ukraine and America’s capacity to fight in more than one theatre.
What “Virtually All” Actually Means
The claim must be handled precisely. It refers principally to the US Army’s stockpile of ATACMS and PrSM surface-to-surface missiles, not every long-range precision missile operated by the United States.
America still possesses other strike options, including sea-launched Tomahawk cruise missiles, air-launched JASSM-ER weapons, shorter-range guided rockets, precision glide bombs and weapons held by other services. Those inventories are separate, although several have also been heavily drawn down and none provides a perfect one-for-one replacement for a missile fired from a mobile Army launcher.
ATACMS is the older weapon, with a range of roughly 300 kilometres depending on the version. PrSM is its replacement, designed to travel beyond 400 kilometres in its initial configuration, carry two missiles in a launcher pod and give ground forces the ability to hit command centres, air defences, launch sites and other high-value targets without sending aircraft into hostile airspace.
The ATACMS production line was already being phased out as the Army moved towards PrSM. The newer missile, however, entered service with a naturally small inventory because it had only recently begun moving from development into large-scale production. America therefore entered the Iran conflict with one family of missiles approaching retirement and its replacement not yet accumulated in wartime numbers.
How America Used Them So Quickly
The central explanation is operational risk. Long-range precision missiles allow commanders to attack a distant target without exposing a pilot and aircraft to Iranian air defences, reducing the immediate danger to American personnel.
That advantage makes the weapons extremely attractive in a prolonged campaign. Every suspected missile launcher, hardened command site, air-defence node or time-sensitive target can create pressure for another launch, particularly when commanders believe waiting could allow the target to move or fire first.
The geography of Iran intensifies the demand. It is a vast country with dispersed military infrastructure, difficult terrain and targets positioned far from the coast. Ground-launched missiles can respond rapidly once a launcher is in range, but a five-month conflict turns a capability originally bought in limited numbers for exceptional targets into a continuously consumed resource.
The depletion also appears to have happened in stages. US Central Command reportedly drew down the missiles held in the region, then received additional weapons from American stocks elsewhere. That kept the campaign supplied, but it did not create new missiles; it shifted strategic reserves from one theatre to another.
This is the uncomfortable mathematics of precision warfare. A missile costing more than $1 million can disappear in minutes, while replacing it requires specialised motors, energetics, seekers, electronics, test equipment, secure supply chains and months of industrial work.
Are More Missiles Being Built?
Yes—on a scale far above the pre-war plan. The US Army’s fiscal year 2027 budget request seeks 1,134 PrSM missiles: 680 through its discretionary request and another 454 through accelerated munitions funding. That compares with 108 in the fiscal year 2026 spending plan.
The proposed increase is dramatic, but a budget request is not an immediate delivery. Congress must fund it, contracts must be placed, suppliers must expand, components must arrive and completed missiles must pass testing before they enter operational magazines.
The broader rearmament programme is even larger. The Pentagon has moved to expand Patriot and THAAD interceptor production, pursue a major increase in Tomahawk output and maximise orders for air-launched JASSM-ER missiles. The Air Force’s 2027 plan calls for 821 JASSM weapons and up to 1,000 lower-cost Family of Affordable Mass Missiles intended to generate greater volume without using the most expensive weapon against every target.
Tomahawk production is also supposed to rise from roughly 60 weapons a year for the United States towards an eventual rate of 1,000. Patriot component capacity is planned to triple and THAAD capacity to quadruple under new framework agreements.
These numbers show that Washington understands the scale of the problem. They do not show that the problem has already been solved.
Factories cannot jump from peacetime output to mass production merely because a contract has been signed. Rocket motors, microelectronics, castings, explosives and skilled labour can become bottlenecks, while the same companies and suppliers are being asked to accelerate several missile families simultaneously.
ATACMS itself is unlikely to return as the main answer because the Army has committed to its successor. The recovery strategy is therefore not simply to rebuild the old stockpile; it is to manufacture PrSM at scale while expanding a wider family of land-, sea- and air-launched weapons.
What Can the US Use Instead?
The closest ground-launched alternative is the Army’s Mid-Range Capability, which can fire Tomahawk and SM-6 missiles. It gives land forces a longer reach than ATACMS or the first PrSM variant, but it depends on weapons also required by the Navy and draws from inventories facing their own pressures.
The Air Force can use JASSM-ER, a stealthy air-launched cruise missile designed to strike defended targets from stand-off distance. This is one of the most credible substitutes for parts of the deep-strike mission, but it requires suitable aircraft, airbases, tanker support, mission planning and access to contested airspace.
Stealth bombers and combat aircraft can also deliver JDAMs, Small Diameter Bombs and other precision weapons. These are generally cheaper and more abundant than high-end missiles, but they require the aircraft to approach much closer to the target, increasing risk to crews and expensive platforms.
Extended-range GMLRS rockets can cover some missions at shorter distances. Drones and loitering munitions can attack softer targets or overwhelm defences at lower cost, while electronic warfare and cyber operations may suppress some systems without a missile strike. None duplicates the speed, payload, survivability and responsive ground launch of PrSM across every target set.
Long-range hypersonic weapons could eventually provide another option, while Blackbeard and other lower-cost projects are intended to increase affordable strike capacity. Their strategic importance is growing, but future programmes cannot be counted as full magazines today.
The real substitute is therefore a layered combination: preserve the most advanced missiles for targets that genuinely require them, use cheaper weapons against lower-value targets, accept greater operational risk in selected missions and increase the role of air and naval forces. That is a workable military response, but it is also an admission that scarcity is now shaping how America fights.
Why China Is Watching Closely
The most consequential audience is in Beijing. A conflict over Taiwan would demand enormous numbers of long-range anti-ship, land-attack and air-defence weapons in an environment where Chinese missiles could threaten regional airfields and force American aircraft and ships to operate from greater distances.
PrSM is particularly important to the Army’s Indo-Pacific concept because mobile launchers dispersed across allied islands could threaten ships, airbases, missile units and logistics hubs. A depleted inventory weakens that option until production recovers.
This does not mean China has been handed a free opportunity to attack. The United States retains nuclear deterrence, submarines, bombers, carrier groups, allied bases and multiple missile families. Beijing must also consider Japan, Australia, the Philippines and the immense economic consequences of war.
The danger lies in perception. Deterrence can weaken before a military becomes incapable of fighting if an adversary concludes that leaders are distracted, inventories are thin or Washington would hesitate to open a second front.
Russia, Ukraine and America’s Allies Face Harder Choices
Moscow will see the same pressure from a different direction. ATACMS supplied to Ukraine have allowed attacks on high-value Russian targets, but a severe American shortage makes every further transfer more politically and militarily costly.
The trade-off is no longer abstract. A missile sent to Ukraine, retained for Europe, moved to the Middle East or reserved for the Indo-Pacific cannot occupy all four roles at once. Even if the eventual production surge is large enough to serve every theatre, the gap before those weapons arrive forces prioritisation.
Allies dependent on American missile defence face an even sharper problem. The offensive missile shortage is occurring alongside major reported reductions in Patriot and THAAD interceptors, which defend bases, cities and infrastructure against incoming ballistic missiles. There is no easy substitute for those defensive systems.
European and Asian allies will respond by seeking firm US allocation guarantees, expanding their own production and buying alternative systems. In the long term, that could create a stronger allied industrial base. In the short term, it could produce competition between partners for scarce deliveries.
Iran Has Exposed the Limits of the Arsenal
Iran did not need to match the United States weapon for weapon. By dispersing targets, maintaining missile pressure and extending the conflict, Tehran forced Washington to spend highly sophisticated munitions faster than a peacetime industrial base could replenish them.
That does not make the Iranian military stronger than America’s. It shows how a weaker power can impose disproportionate costs through endurance, hardened infrastructure, cheap drones, ballistic missiles and geography.
The result may also constrain Washington’s next decision. If another major strike package would consume weapons required for China or leave regional bases with insufficient protection, diplomacy gains value even when the political language remains uncompromising.
The New Arms Race Is About Production
For decades, American military superiority was measured through advanced platforms: stealth aircraft, nuclear submarines, satellites and precision weapons. The Iran war has demonstrated that the decisive question in a prolonged conflict may be less glamorous: how many usable weapons can leave factories every month?
China has invested heavily in mass missile forces close to its likely theatre of operations. Russia has expanded wartime production and combined advanced missiles with cheaper drones. America retains extraordinary technological advantages, but technology cannot compensate indefinitely for an empty launcher.
Washington’s response is now visible in four moves: ordering PrSM in far larger quantities, accelerating Tomahawk and JASSM production, building cheaper mass missiles and expanding the industrial base behind defensive interceptors. The strategy is directionally sound, but the transition carries risk because delivery schedules lag behind geopolitical events.
The strongest conclusion is not that America has run out of military power. It is that the United States has discovered the limits of a force designed around small stocks of exquisite weapons at the precise moment when Iran, Russia and China are testing whether Western production can sustain several confrontations at once.
Contracts can rebuild the arsenal. Factories can expand. New missiles can replace old ones. But none of that happens instantly, and until it does, every new crisis carries a harder question: not whether America has a weapon capable of striking the target, but whether it can afford to fire it.
