Trump says the US “has to have” Greenland after naming a special envoy
As of December 23, 2025, President Donald Trump has revived a blunt idea that most leaders in Europe and the Arctic have spent years trying to bury: the United States should end up with Greenland. The immediate trigger was his decision to name Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as a special envoy focused on the island, followed by Trump’s assertion that the US “has to have” Greenland.
It matters now because Greenland is not just a map curiosity. It sits on the Arctic’s strategic front line, hosts a critical US military installation, and has long been pulled between its push for greater self-rule and the reality of its economic dependence on Denmark. When Washington speaks about ownership, the question stops being abstract. It becomes about sovereignty, alliance trust, and the limits of power politics inside NATO.
This piece explains the implications of Trump's envoy move, the reasons behind Denmark and Greenland's strong pushback, and the realistic pathways that could emerge from this situation. It also breaks down the incentives on all sides and the scenarios that could turn a political provocation into a durable diplomatic crisis.
“The story turns on whether the US is escalating rhetoric for leverage or laying track for a concrete attempt to reshape Greenland’s future.”
Key Points
Trump has appointed Louisiana Governor Jeff Landry as a special envoy for Greenland, then stated the US “has to have” Greenland on national security grounds.
Denmark and Greenland have rejected any notion of a takeover, framing the issue as sovereignty and international law, not bargaining.
Greenland’s strategic value is real: Arctic geography, missile-warning infrastructure, and growing great-power attention in the High North.
Greenland also has economic and resource stakes, but mining and infrastructure constraints mean “critical minerals” are not a quick win.
The most plausible near-term outcome is not annexation but pressure: investment offers, security demands, and diplomatic brinkmanship.
The risk is alliance damage: if this becomes coercive, it tests NATO cohesion and Denmark’s ability to manage Greenland’s security role.
Background
Greenland is a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark. It has its own parliament and government for many domestic matters, while Denmark retains responsibility for key areas including defense and foreign affairs. Greenland’s modern autonomy is rooted in the Self-Government Act, which also recognises the Greenlanders’ right to self-determination and sets out a lawful pathway to independence if Greenland chooses it.
The island's economy faces limitations due to geography, climate, and infrastructure, despite its vast landmass. Denmark provides an annual subsidy that underpins public services and stabilizes the budget. That fiscal reality sits behind most debates about independence: many Greenlanders want greater sovereignty, but the timeline depends on whether Greenland can build a broader economic base.
Strategically, the United States has long treated Greenland as critical to North Atlantic and Arctic security. The US operates a major military installation on the island, now known as Pituffik Space Base (formerly Thule Air Base). Its mission is tied to missile warning, missile defense support, and space surveillance. US planners consider this geography essential in a world of faster missiles and more contested space systems.
Trump’s interest in Greenland is not new. In his earlier presidency, he publicly floated the idea of buying Greenland, which was rejected by Danish and Greenlandic officials. What is different in late 2025 is the tone and the formalisation: naming a special envoy and speaking about necessity moves the subject from speculative chatter to a deliberate political line.
Analysis
Political and Geopolitical Dimensions
Each party wants something specific, and each has strict limits.
Washington wants a freer hand in the Arctic. That can mean guaranteed access, fewer diplomatic constraints, and more leverage against Russia and China as Arctic activity grows. The limit is legitimacy: acquiring territory is not something allies accept casually, and any hint of coercion against a NATO partner becomes a credibility problem for US leadership.
Copenhagen aims to safeguard the unity of the kingdom and maintain the principle that pressure should not alter borders. Denmark also wants to keep Greenland aligned with the West and to ensure US defence cooperation continues without turning Greenland into a bargaining chip.
Nuuk seeks respect and flexibility. Greenlandic leaders can embrace investment and security cooperation, ensuring that Greenlanders determine Greenland's future. Their limit lies in capacity: Greenland lacks the necessary institutional resources to effectively manage a geopolitical conflict while simultaneously managing daily operations and strategising long-term economic growth.
From here, four realistic scenarios stand out.
First, the “pressure without paperwork” scenario: sharp rhetoric continues, the envoy role is used to signal intent, and the US pushes for expanded basing rights, radar upgrades, and a more explicit Arctic posture, without making a formal territorial demand.
Second, the “investment lever” scenario: Washington pairs the rhetoric with targeted economic offers meant to loosen Denmark’s fiscal grip and build political goodwill in Greenland, while framing it as a partnership rather than a purchase.
Third, the “alliance pushback” scenario: Denmark rallies Nordic and European partners, hardens diplomatic lines, and insists NATO unity requires Washington to step back. This becomes less likely if Washington moderates its tone and more likely if US officials talk about force or annexation.
Fourth, the “Greenland acceleration” scenario: the pressure speeds up Greenland’s internal debate on independence, not toward the US, but toward a new settlement with Denmark and broader external partners.
Economic and Market Impact
Greenland is often framed as a treasure chest of minerals, but markets care about extraction reality, not headlines. Mining in Greenland faces high costs, difficult logistics, environmental constraints, and political sensitivity. Even where deposits exist, turning them into export volumes is slow. That is why a geopolitical fight over “resources” can outpace what the resource sector can actually deliver.
The more immediate economic impact is political risk. If rhetoric rises, it can chill long-term investment decisions because investors cannot price sovereignty uncertainty. It can also push Denmark to increase spending commitments to Greenland, both to reinforce unity and to answer criticisms about underinvestment.
In the US, the economic angle is more indirect: defence procurement and Arctic infrastructure planning gain political support when Greenland is treated as urgent. That does not automatically translate to new projects, but it shapes the policy climate.
Technological and Security Implications
This is the complex kernel beneath the politics: early warning and Arctic geometry.
Pituffik’s role in missile warning and space surveillance makes Greenland part of the “first notice” layer for threats transiting polar routes. Even modest shifts in base access, radar modernisation, or host-nation cooperation can matter in crisis planning. That is why US officials repeatedly frame Greenland in national security terms.
At the same time, a stronger US posture in Greenland does not require ownership. Agreements, funding, and partnerships achieve operational access. That is the quiet reality many strategists emphasise: Washington can get most of what it needs without igniting a sovereignty confrontation.
The security risk is that coercive language produces the opposite of stability. It can harden political resistance in Denmark and Greenland, invite counter-messaging from Russia and China, and turn routine-based cooperation into a permanent political argument.
Social and Cultural Fallout
Greenland is not an empty stage. Its politics are shaped by identity, language, and memory, including the long arc of colonial governance and disputes over past relocations and development choices. When a major power speaks in ownership terms, it can land as disrespect rather than strategy.
Inside Greenland, the rhetoric can polarise debate. Some may see US attention as leverage for investment and autonomy. Others may fear becoming a pawn, with local priorities drowned out by security talk. Either way, the cost is social: trust becomes harder to maintain, and political compromise becomes easier to attack.
In Denmark, the issue cuts to sovereignty and alliance trust. Speaking about a NATO ally as a target for acquisition is not merely offensive. It creates real questions about how dependable the alliance framework is when interests collide.
What Most Coverage Misses
The factor that is often overlooked is the fact that Greenland's future is not a straightforward path between Denmark and the US. The real hinge is Greenland’s internal capacity to sustain autonomy: revenue, workforce, institutions, and infrastructure.
That is why the most effective lever is not a dramatic “takeover” claim. It is the slower work of shaping Greenland’s options. If Denmark increases fiscal and development support, it makes independence harder to justify quickly. If the US offers credible investment and long-term partnership without sovereignty demands, it could widen Greenland’s room to negotiate with Denmark. If the US makes the issue coercive, it likely shrinks that room by forcing Greenlandic leaders to rally defensively.
In other words, the decisive contest is less about flags and more about funding, feasibility, and political legitimacy.
Why This Matters: Greenland and the West’s Arctic posture
In the short term, the most affected groups are Greenland’s government and communities that depend on predictable funding and stable external relationships. Diplomatic turbulence can slow investment, complicate development plans, and distract leadership from domestic priorities.
Alliance credibility affects Denmark. A dispute over Greenland is not only bilateral; it touches how smaller NATO states judge US restraint and how European partners respond when sovereignty is challenged rhetorically.
In the longer term, the issue is the Arctic’s governance model. If major powers talk about “having” territory as a security requirement, it normalises a harder era in which geography is treated as spoils rather than partnership. That increases the odds of miscalculation.
What to watch next is concrete, not theatrical: whether Denmark formally escalates diplomatic measures; whether US officials schedule high-profile visits or announce new defence spending tied to Greenland; whether Greenlandic leaders propose new frameworks for foreign engagement; and whether any party puts a written proposal on the table rather than a slogan.
Real-World Impact
A fisheries worker in Nuuk sees the political storm as a risk to everyday stability. Investment uncertainty makes it harder to plan long-term jobs, and geopolitical drama can crowd out bread-and-butter issues like housing and local infrastructure.
A Danish civil servant in Copenhagen faces an alliance dilemma: keeping defence cooperation smooth while responding firmly enough to satisfy domestic expectations regarding sovereignty. Every statement becomes a negotiation.
A US Space Force contractor, rotating through Pituffik, finds himself torn between his mission and politics. The work is technical and routine, but public controversy can affect logistics, visits, and the tone of host-nation cooperation.
A European mining executive considering Greenland projects has to reprice risk. Even if resources are attractive, sovereign uncertainty and public backlash can delay timelines and raise costs.
What’s Next?
Trump’s envoy appointment and “has to have” line have turned Greenland from a periodic talking point into a live alliance test. Denmark and Greenland are drawing a bright line: partnership is welcome, ownership is not.
The fork in the road is whether Washington treats this as leverage for stronger Arctic cooperation or tries to shift the conversation toward a territorial end-state that allies will resist. The first path still creates friction, but it can be managed through agreements and funding. The second path risks turning a strategic partnership into an open-ended political confrontation.
The clearest signals will be practical: who meets whom, what agreements are proposed, what money is offered, and whether the language shifts from necessity to negotiation. If the rhetoric stays maximalist while policy steps become more concrete, the story hardens into a sustained crisis. If the rhetoric cools and the focus moves to defence upgrades and investment partnerships, it becomes a tense episode that still leaves a mark.
