Vance Says ‘All Options’ Are Open Against Iran — How Far Could Trump Go and Could It Turn Nuclear?

The Strait That Could Ignite a Wider War

All Options on the Table

JD Vance has sent Iran an unmistakable warning: the United States is not closing off military, economic, diplomatic or covert options as the confrontation over the Strait of Hormuz enters another dangerous phase. The vice president has also ruled out negotiations while Tehran continues attacking commercial shipping, leaving Washington and Iran without an obvious diplomatic exit as renewed strikes push the conflict back towards escalation.

The immediate danger is not that Washington is preparing to launch nuclear weapons. It is that conventional escalation could keep climbing through repeated US strikes, Iranian retaliation, attacks on Gulf states and commercial vessels, energy disruption and pressure for still harder military action until decisions that currently look extreme become easier to contemplate.

Vance Leaves Washington’s Options Deliberately Open

Speaking at the White House on September 3, Vance argued that major US combat operations against Iran had ended but acknowledged that fighting had flared again. He refused to give a timetable for an end to the confrontation and said the central condition was straightforward: Iran must stop attacking commercial ships moving through the Strait of Hormuz.

Washington still has formidable forces positioned across the region. More than 50,000 US personnel are deployed in the Middle East and nearly 20 warships have been involved in the military build-up and blockade effort, while fresh American strikes this week targeted Iranian coastal military positions after attacks connected to shipping through Hormuz.

That gives President Donald Trump a long escalation ladder before nuclear weapons would even enter serious consideration. The United States can intensify attacks on missile launchers, naval facilities, air defences, mine-laying capabilities, command infrastructure and other military targets while increasing sanctions and tightening Iran's ability to export oil.

The danger lies in what Tehran does in return. Iran can target US forces, threaten Gulf allies, lay or deploy more mines, attack tankers and force Washington to choose repeatedly between tolerating Iranian retaliation and striking harder.

The Strait of Hormuz Is the Centre of the Crisis

Iran's greatest strategic weapon may not be a ballistic missile. It is geography.

The Strait of Hormuz carried an average of 20.9 million barrels of oil per day during the first half of 2025, equivalent to roughly 20% of global petroleum liquids consumption. Saudi and Emirati pipelines provide some ability to bypass the waterway, but their combined spare alternative capacity is only a fraction of the oil normally moving through the strait.

That means disruption can rapidly become everybody's problem. Shipping traffic remains far below peacetime levels despite American claims of substantial progress reopening the route, and renewed fighting has again driven concern through energy markets.

Brent crude was trading around $96 a barrel on September 4 and heading for one of its strongest weekly rises in months after the latest US-Iran exchanges. A sustained closure or renewed wave of tanker attacks would raise the risk of another oil shock, higher transport costs and renewed inflation pressure well beyond the Middle East.

That gives both sides powerful but conflicting incentives. Washington wants to prove Iran cannot control global energy flows through military coercion. Tehran needs Washington to believe that attempting to economically suffocate Iran carries a global price.

Could the Conflict Actually Go Nuclear?

Yes, but nuclear use remains a remote escalation scenario rather than the most likely outcome.

The United States possesses overwhelming conventional military power and does not need nuclear weapons to inflict enormous damage on Iranian military infrastructure. Unless the strategic picture changed dramatically, conventional strikes would offer Washington far more military flexibility while avoiding the extraordinary political, humanitarian and geopolitical consequences of breaking the nuclear taboo.

The more credible nuclear danger is different: prolonged war could strengthen the argument inside Iran that the country ultimately needs a nuclear weapon to deter future attacks.

Iran is not currently known to possess an operational nuclear weapon. However, the unresolved status of its highly enriched uranium has become one of the most dangerous uncertainties surrounding the conflict.

Iran’s Missing Uranium Stockpile Matters

Before the United States and Israel struck Iranian nuclear facilities in June 2025, the International Atomic Energy Agency estimated that Iran possessed 440.9 kilograms of uranium enriched to as much as 60% purity. Weapons-grade uranium is generally around 90%, meaning Iran had accumulated material significantly beyond ordinary civilian enrichment levels but had not yet crossed that final enrichment threshold.

The IAEA says inspectors still have not regained access to key facilities affected by those attacks. The agency has therefore lost continuity of knowledge over the stockpile and says it cannot establish how much of the material remains or precisely where all of it is. It has described that uncertainty as a proliferation concern requiring urgent attention.

According to the IAEA's standard yardstick, the previous 60%-enriched stock could, if further enriched, contain enough material for multiple nuclear weapons. That does not mean Iran possesses nuclear bombs: further enrichment, weaponisation, engineering, testing decisions and a reliable delivery system are separate steps. But it means the nuclear question sits directly underneath every calculation about escalation.

Military pressure therefore creates a paradox. Successful strikes can damage Iran's nuclear infrastructure, yet an Iranian leadership that concludes conventional deterrence has failed may become more—not less—convinced that only a nuclear deterrent can ultimately guarantee regime survival.

A US Nuclear Strike Remains an Extreme Scenario

For Washington itself to contemplate nuclear use, the conflict would probably have to change fundamentally.

An Iranian nuclear breakout accompanied by credible preparations for use, a catastrophic weapons-of-mass-destruction attack, or a scenario in which another nuclear-armed power became directly involved would move the crisis into a different strategic category. None of those conditions is currently established.

The more realistic escalation pathway remains conventional: Iranian attack, US retaliation, Iranian counterattack and then another American strike designed to impose greater costs.

That cycle is dangerous precisely because neither side needs to decide in advance to start a much larger war. It can arrive incrementally.

Gulf States Risk Being Dragged Further Into the Fight

Iranian missile and drone operations have already widened the geography of the conflict. Iranian forces have targeted US-linked installations and regional locations, including attacks directed towards Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates during the latest exchange.

For Gulf governments, this creates an increasingly uncomfortable position. Many want strong American protection and freedom of navigation while simultaneously trying to avoid becoming direct belligerents in a prolonged US-Iran conflict.

Repeated Iranian attacks could eventually make that balancing act impossible. If a strike causes large numbers of casualties in Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE or another American partner, pressure for direct retaliation would rise sharply.

That is one of the clearest routes from a US-Iran confrontation into a genuine regional war.

Russia Sees an Opportunity as Well as a Risk

Moscow has strong reasons to prevent Iran from being strategically broken.

Russian President Vladimir Putin met Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian this week and pledged continued assistance while both governments criticised American pressure. Russia and Iran have already built an increasingly important military and economic relationship, creating another layer of geopolitical competition around the conflict.

Russia is unlikely to want a direct war with the United States over Iran. It does not need one to complicate Washington's position.

Intelligence assistance, military technology, economic support and diplomatic coordination can make Iran harder to isolate while forcing the United States to divide strategic attention between Europe and the Middle East.

That matters because American forces and military assets do not exist in unlimited supply. Some US resources committed to the Middle East have already been drawn from Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

A prolonged Iran confrontation therefore benefits America's rivals even if they never fire directly at American forces.

China Has an Even More Complicated Calculation

China needs Gulf energy, trades extensively across the region and has no interest in seeing the Strait of Hormuz become permanently unusable.

At the same time, Beijing does not want the United States to emerge with uncontested strategic dominance over Iran and the Gulf. Nor does it necessarily want the Iranian state to collapse into instability.

The result is a balancing act. China benefits from preventing economic catastrophe and keeping energy moving, but it also retains an incentive to resist a geopolitical outcome that leaves Tehran completely dependent on Washington's terms.

Vance has suggested Beijing is showing greater willingness to cooperate with American pressure on Iran. Whether that extends beyond protecting energy flows and into genuine participation in Washington's attempt to isolate Tehran will be one of the most important diplomatic questions of the coming weeks.

Regime Change Would Raise the Stakes Again

Another major question is whether the ultimate objective remains coercion or expands towards regime change.

Iran is a large state with tens of millions of people, extensive military infrastructure, powerful security institutions, missile forces and numerous internal political and ethnic fault lines. Destroying parts of its military capacity is one problem; controlling the consequences of governmental collapse would be another altogether.

A destabilised Iran could produce competing armed centres of power, refugee movements, attacks across borders and uncertainty over nuclear material and missile systems.

That is why regime collapse would not automatically mean strategic victory for Washington. It could instead open the most unpredictable phase of the entire conflict.

The Most Dangerous Trigger Would Be Mass American Casualties

The single development most likely to transform Washington's response would be an Iranian strike killing a large number of Americans.

US commanders and political leaders can tolerate limited exchanges while portraying them as controlled retaliation. A mass-casualty attack would change the domestic political equation almost instantly.

The White House would face pressure to demonstrate overwhelming deterrence, while Iran could interpret a much larger American response as an attempt to threaten the survival of the state.

Once both sides believe backing down is more dangerous than escalating, crisis management becomes dramatically harder.

What Happens Next

The most plausible near-term future is continued coercive pressure rather than immediate total war.

Washington can intensify economic isolation, maintain the naval blockade and strike Iranian military assets when Tehran interferes with shipping. Iran can continue using missiles, drones and maritime disruption to demonstrate that American pressure carries a cost.

Eventually, both governments may again decide that controlled diplomacy is preferable to permanent escalation. But Vance has made clear that Washington currently wants Iran to stop attacking commercial shipping before talks resume, while Tehran has little incentive to abandon one of its strongest bargaining tools without receiving something in return.

That is the trap at the heart of the crisis.

Nuclear war is not the most likely destination. A widening conventional conflict, another energy shock and a harder Iranian push towards a future nuclear deterrent are considerably more credible dangers.

The greatest risk is therefore not that either side wakes up tomorrow intending to launch a nuclear weapon. It is that every conventional escalation makes the next one easier, diplomacy harder and the nuclear question more central until a conflict neither Washington nor Tehran originally intended becomes far more difficult to stop.