How Ageing Populations Will Reshape the World Over the Next 25 Years
Across much of the world, the basic shape of society is turning upside down. Fewer children are being born, people are living longer, and the number of older adults is rising faster than most governments ever planned for. In some countries, there are already more people over 65 than there are children. Within 25 years, that pattern will spread far beyond today’s richest economies.
New data on pensions and demographics show how quickly the balance is shifting. Global projections now point to more than two billion people over 60 by mid-century, with the share of over-65s rising from around one in ten people in 2022 to about one in six by 2050. In OECD countries, there could be roughly 52 people aged 65 and over for every 100 people of working age by the middle of the century, up from about 33 today.
That change is already driving political fights over pension ages, tax breaks and health spending from Berlin to Tokyo to London. It will also shape where companies invest, which regions struggle to find workers, and how younger generations think about family, work and savings.
This piece looks at how ageing populations are likely to change politics, economics, culture and technology over the next 25 years, and what choices governments, employers and households face as the world grows older.
The story turns on whether societies can turn longer lives into a demographic dividend instead of a slow-burn social and economic crisis.
Key Points
The share of older adults is rising fast, with people aged 65+ expected to make up roughly one in six people worldwide by 2050, up from about one in ten today.
Pension systems and health services will face intense pressure, pushing governments toward higher retirement ages, new taxes and deeper reforms.
Labor markets will tighten in many countries, forcing a mix of later retirement, automation, migration and retraining to keep economies growing.
Politics will tilt toward older voters, raising the risk of intergenerational tension if younger people feel over-taxed and under-served.
Technology and AI can boost productivity and support independent living but cannot fully offset the economic hit from ageing populations.
Emerging economies will “grow old” much faster than today’s rich countries did, often without robust pension or health systems in place.
Background
The world is moving through what demographers call the “age-structural transition.” Birth rates have fallen as education levels have risen, women have gained more control over their lives, and the cost of raising children has increased. At the same time, better sanitation, vaccines, and medical care have pushed life expectancy higher in almost every region.
As a result, older age groups are growing much faster than younger ones. The global population aged 65 and over was about 10% of humanity in 2022 and is projected to reach around 16% by 2050. At the same time, the number of people aged 60 and over is expected to roughly double to more than two billion.
The pattern is uneven. Japan already has roughly 30% of its population aged 65 or older, the highest share in the world. Many European countries are close behind, and several East Asian economies—including South Korea and China—are ageing at record speed. By contrast, large parts of Africa and South Asia still have young populations, but fertility rates there are also falling, meaning ageing will eventually reach them too.
A key way to understand the strain is the “old-age dependency ratio” — the number of people aged 65 or older per 100 people of working age. In 2000, across OECD countries, there were about 22 older people for every 100 working-age adults. Today it is around 33; by 2050, projections suggest it could reach about 52. That means far fewer workers for each retiree, unless countries find ways to keep more older adults in the labor force.
This demographic backdrop is the starting point for almost every major policy debate coming over the next quarter-century.
Analysis
Political and Geopolitical Dimensions
Ageing reshapes power. Older people vote more reliably than younger ones and tend to prioritise pensions, healthcare and safety over radical change. As the share of older voters grows, political parties will find it harder to push through painful reforms, even when budgets are under strain.
This tension is already visible. In Europe, parliaments have spent years arguing over how far and how fast to raise state pension ages. In Germany, lawmakers recently passed a pension package designed to preserve benefit levels in the near term, despite concerns from younger members of the governing bloc about long-run costs. They have been promised a further round of reforms by the middle of the decade, a sign of how politically fragile the issue has become.
Other countries are tweaking the tax treatment of pension contributions, tightening early-retirement rules, or launching formal reviews of state pension ages. Each step tends to spark protests, strikes or at least a round of angry debate. Over the next 25 years, more of these battles are likely as governments try to contain costs without losing older voters.
Ageing also feeds into geopolitics. Countries with shrinking workforces may be less willing to sustain long ground wars or large standing armies, and more inclined to use technology or alliances instead. At the same time, older, richer societies will need migrant workers to fill jobs in care, construction, logistics and healthcare. Younger countries—especially in Africa and parts of Asia—will face pressure to export labor, skills and services.
That sets up a long-term negotiation: how to manage migration in a way that supports ageing economies without fuelling a backlash in destination countries or draining talent from those of origin.
Economic and Market Impact
At its simplest, ageing squeezes the numbers. With more retirees and fewer workers, governments collect less tax per person while facing higher bills for pensions, long-term care and age-related health conditions.
The old-age dependency ratio is set to rise sharply by 2050. That implies either higher taxes, lower benefits, longer working lives—or some combination of all three. For markets, this mix will influence everything from government borrowing costs to demand for health technology and senior-focused housing.
Companies will feel the shift through labor shortages and changing consumer demand. Sectors like elder care, pharmaceuticals, medical devices, insurance, home retrofitting and “silver economy” services are likely to expand. By contrast, industries that depend on large cohorts of young workers or customers may need to reinvent themselves.
Automation and AI offer part of the answer. Robots can handle some physically demanding jobs in warehouses, factories and even hospitals. Software can streamline administration, diagnostics and logistics. But even rapid AI adoption is unlikely to fully offset the economic drag from ageing populations. Productivity gains help, but they do not completely compensate for fewer workers and rising fiscal pressure.
Capital markets will also adjust. As more people move into retirement, they tend to draw down savings and seek stable income. That can shift demand toward bonds, infrastructure and dividend-paying companies. Meanwhile, governments may look to channel long-term pension savings into domestic investment in a bid to support growth and fund the transition to cleaner energy and digital infrastructure.
Social and Cultural Fallout
Ageing societies do not just change balance sheets; they change how life is lived.
The traditional “three-stage life”—education, work, retirement—is already fading. People are retraining in their 40s and 50s, starting businesses later in life, or moving in and out of part-time roles as carers. Over the next 25 years, that pattern will become more common, especially if retirement ages rise and healthy life expectancy improves.
Family structures are shifting as well. With fewer children per family and more people living into their 80s and 90s, many households will find themselves supporting very old parents and sometimes grandparents. That increases the load on unpaid carers, who are often women, and raises the risk of burnout, financial strain and stalled careers.
Social cohesion will also be tested. Younger adults facing high taxes, student debt, expensive housing and insecure work may question why so much public spending is locked into benefits for older generations. Older adults may feel they have “paid in” and are simply receiving what was promised. How societies handle that conversation—fairly or bitterly—will shape politics and social norms.
Technological and Security Implications
An ageing world is a huge market for technology, but also a source of new vulnerabilities.
Telemedicine, wearables and smart-home systems can help older adults live independently for longer. Remote monitoring can alert doctors or relatives when something is wrong. Robotics may play a bigger role in lifting, mobility support and routine care tasks, especially where labor shortages bite hardest.
But the digital divide matters. Many older adults are comfortable online; many others are not. If banks and public services move too quickly to digital-only models, some of the people who most need support will be left behind. Designing user interfaces and authentication systems with older adults in mind will become a major policy issue.
Security is another concern. Older adults are already common targets for scams and identity theft. As more financial life moves online and more assets sit in pension accounts, criminals have greater incentives to exploit weaknesses. Expect tighter digital ID systems, stronger consumer protections and more cybersecurity education aimed at older age groups.
What Most Coverage Misses
Most debates frame ageing as a burden. That misses two truths.
First, older adults are not simply dependants. They provide childcare, volunteer hours and community leadership. Many stay in paid work for longer. If workplaces adapt—through flexible roles, reskilling and redesigned tasks—older workers can remain productive and preserve valuable experience.
Second, this is not only a rich-country issue. Several middle-income countries are ageing quickly without robust pension systems, universal health coverage or high savings rates. They risk “growing old before growing rich”—a demographic squeeze that arrives before institutions are ready.
Finally, ageing interacts with other shocks. Heatwaves, floods and pandemics hit older adults hardest. Cities and infrastructure that ignore age and disability are more vulnerable to crises. Planning for an ageing world is therefore central to climate resilience, disaster response and economic strategy.
Why This Matters
The next decade will hit advanced economies hardest. Labor shortages will deepen in healthcare, construction and skilled trades. Public debts will collide with rising pension and healthcare costs. Each percentage point rise in the share of older adults increases the pressure.
By the 2040s and early 2050s, the squeeze will spread to large emerging economies such as China, Brazil and Turkey. Many will face rapid ageing at the same time as their growth slows. Later in the century, several African countries that are young today will begin their own transitions.
In practical terms, the next 25 years will bring:
More state pension age reviews.
New tax incentives to boost private saving.
Debates over migration as a tool to balance labor markets.
Wider use of prevention, healthy ageing programs and long-term care planning.
Events to watch include national budgets, formal pension-age reviews, major elections where pension spending becomes a dividing line, and regular demographic projections that can shift policy direction.
Real-World Impact
A nurse in London finds that most of her patients are now over 70 with complex conditions. Staff shortages grow, and debates about raising the retirement age shape her own long-term decisions around savings and housing.
A factory manager in South Korea cannot recruit enough young workers for night shifts. He invests in robotics and adapts roles to suit older workers who want to stay active but cannot manage full-time hours. The transition is costly but keeps output stable.
A mid-career office worker in Mexico supports two school-age children and an ageing parent. Rising health costs and stretched public services push the family toward private insurance and informal support from relatives, limiting career choices.
A fintech entrepreneur in Nigeria notices more older users managing small pensions and remittances. She redesigns her app for simplicity, builds anti-fraud features, and creates finance guides tailored to late-life planning as the region’s own demographic shift begins.
Road Ahead
Ageing populations are not a future shock; they are a present force reshaping budgets, politics, workplaces and families. Longer lives are a triumph, but they collide with systems designed for a world where people died younger and retired later.
Over the next 25 years, governments must decide how far to raise retirement ages, adjust benefits and strengthen savings. Businesses must decide whether to redesign work around multigenerational teams. Families must decide how to share care and costs across three or four generations.
The shift cannot be avoided. The only question is whether societies adapt in time. Watch how quickly pension reforms move, how many older adults stay in the workforce, and how political coalitions shift as the weight of older voters grows. Those signals will show whether ageing populations become a source of renewed prosperity—or a long, grinding test of the social contract.
