What Can Washington Do to Protect Its Gulf Allies?
Why Did An American Strike On An Iranian Island Send People In Bahrain To Shelter?
Twice before dawn on Wednesday 18 November, Bahrain’s Interior Ministry told residents to take shelter. Kuwait was also confronting incoming drones. Hours earlier, American aircraft had struck what a US military official described as an Iranian missile launch site on Qeshm Island. By morning, Iran’s army said it had targeted American military installations at Ali Al Salem Air Base in Kuwait. It was the first Iranian attack on Kuwait since September.
The war that began with US and Israeli strikes on Iran on 28 February is nearly nine months old. What changed this week was its reach. Repeated attacks on Bahrain had already broken a period of relative calm. Bringing Kuwait back into the fighting gives Washington another ally to reassure and Tehran another government with reason to oppose it. A return to sustained regional warfare is possible. Much depends on whether the next attack causes casualties, how the Gulf governments respond and whether diplomats can secure even a narrow agreement on shipping.
What Happened Before the Strike on Qeshm Island?
The sequence began before American aircraft reached Qeshm. Iran had already targeted US facilities in Bahrain on Friday and Sunday. Tehran linked those attacks to American drone surveillance and a strike on Iranian communications towers. On Tuesday, Iran’s Revolutionary Guards said they had targeted an American radar system at Bahrain’s Sheikh Isa base. Bahrain said it intercepted the attack and reported no casualties or damage.
Washington then struck Qeshm, an Iranian island in the Strait of Hormuz. A US military official described the operation as a response to attacks on American personnel and assets. Iranian media, citing an Iranian official, said the strike caused no damage to infrastructure. The public accounts establish where the Americans struck and what they said they were aiming at. How much damage they inflicted remains unclear.
By Wednesday, Iran’s army was naming American drone and missile installations in Kuwait as its targets. Kuwait confirmed that its air defences had intercepted drones. Bahrain also reported interceptions. Neither an Iranian announcement naming a target nor the sound of an interception establishes that a particular building was hit. That distinction matters when assessing what Washington might do next. An attempted attack, the loss of military equipment and the deaths of American or Gulf personnel would present materially different decisions.
Why Kuwait and Bahrain Have a Say in What Happens Next
From Tehran, the common feature of the two countries is the American military presence. Bahrain hosts the headquarters of the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet. Kuwait hosts American forces at Ali Al Salem. By identifying American installations as its intended targets, Iran can portray the attacks as part of its war with Washington. For the people receiving a shelter alert, the nationality of the intended target offers little reassurance.
Kuwait’s response exposed the political weakness in Iran’s position. Its government condemned the attack as a violation of Kuwaiti sovereignty and reserved the right to protect its territory. An air base can host American personnel and still stand on land Kuwait is responsible for defending. Tehran cannot make the Kuwaiti dimension disappear by specifying which equipment it meant to hit.
That gives Washington a difficult conversation with its hosts. A Gulf government can reasonably want stronger protection against another strike while fearing that fresh American retaliation will bring the next attack onto its soil. Both positions follow from the same experience. The people deciding whether to authorise a US response in Washington are several thousand miles from the families waiting for the all-clear in Bahrain.
What Could the United States Do Next?
The most immediate American option is to concentrate on defence while officials establish the consequences of Wednesday’s attacks. Washington could reinforce protection for personnel, share information with the host governments and continue escorting commercial shipping. This approach gives Kuwait and Bahrain a voice in the response. Its drawback is that even successful interceptions leave residents facing repeated alerts and governments relying on their defences to work again.
A further limited strike is also plausible. Tuesday’s action on Qeshm provides the clearest evidence for that judgement. Washington has already shown itself willing to answer an attack on a US facility in Bahrain with force on Iranian territory. But Wednesday’s events reveal the limit of what one strike can achieve. Whatever damage was done on Qeshm, the operation did not prevent Iran from targeting another Gulf state hours later. Officials considering a second response would have to ask what they expect it to accomplish beyond demonstrating American resolve.
The administration could also retain economic pressure while giving Qatar and Oman room to negotiate. The American naval blockade has imposed costs on Iran, while US military escorts have helped some oil shipments through Hormuz. Keeping that policy in place would let Washington avoid an immediate expansion of the air war. It would also leave Tehran with an incentive to demonstrate how much disruption it can still cause while under blockade.
A sustained American campaign would be a larger decision. Confirmed deaths, repeated attacks despite warnings or a sharp deterioration in commercial shipping could increase political pressure for one. Yet a campaign intended to reassure Gulf allies could meet resistance from those same allies if they expected to bear much of the retaliation. As of Wednesday’s initial reporting, Washington had announced no such decision in response to the overnight attacks.
Why the Strait of Hormuz Matters Beyond the Gulf
The commercial cost of the fighting was already visible at sea. On Wednesday, the United Arab Emirates’ ADNOC said that an attack on one of its vessels in the strait the previous day had injured eleven crew members and left one missing. For shipping companies deciding whether to send another crew through, that incident carries more weight than a general assurance that passage is possible.
Before this war, the scale of the trade was enormous. The US Energy Information Administration put oil flows through Hormuz at an average of 20 million barrels a day in 2024, equivalent to about a fifth of global petroleum liquids consumption. Around a fifth of the world’s liquefied natural gas trade also passed through the strait that year, much of it from Qatar. Those are pre-war figures. They explain why restoring reliable passage matters even to countries far beyond the fighting.
A tanker that completes the journey under escort delivers its cargo. It cannot tell the owner of the next vessel whether the crossing will be safe next week, whether insurance will be affordable or whether a buyer can depend on a delivery date. That gap between an individual passage and a dependable shipping route is where the conflict reaches consumers. A refinery seeking replacement oil may have to compete with buyers elsewhere. The price effect can travel much further than the disrupted cargo ever would have done.
Could This Become an All-Out Regional Conflict?
Yes. The most plausible route is a sequence of decisions that each government considers justified at the time. This week offers a short example. Iran described its attacks as responses to earlier American actions. Washington cited attacks on Americans to explain Qeshm. Iran then widened its attacks to Kuwait. Each side can point to an earlier incident to explain its behaviour, while the geographical reach of the fighting continues to grow.
Casualties could change that calculation quickly. A government that has successfully intercepted drones has room to consult its partners before acting. A government facing bereaved families and evidence that the same site has come under repeated attack faces a different political choice. A further danger comes from overlapping fronts. The Saudi-led coalition also reported intercepting a Houthi attack directed towards Riyadh. An incident involving Yemen and Saudi Arabia could demand attention from Gulf leaders just as they are trying to contain a separate exchange involving Iran and the United States.
There is also a credible route towards a narrower conflict. On Tuesday, the same day as the Qeshm strike, Iran’s foreign minister delivered a written message from President Masoud Pezeshkian to Oman’s Sultan Haitham. Qatari officials were also in contact with Iranian counterparts. Oman and Iran had already discussed a temporary navigation corridor and measures to clear mines in August. Those talks give diplomats a defined question to work on even while the governments disagree about the war itself.
The first convincing evidence of restraint may therefore come from a ship’s operator. If commercial vessels can make repeated crossings, crews can return safely and owners can schedule the next voyage with confidence, a limited agreement will have changed something tangible. If shelter alerts continue across the Gulf while seafarers are injured or go missing, ministers will have an increasingly difficult time arguing that the conflict is under control.
Sources
Associated Press — The attacks on Kuwait and Bahrain, shelter alerts and US military escorts. apnews.com
Reuters — The Bahrain radar attack, the American strike on Qeshm and talks with mediators. Reuters
Reuters via GMA News — Kuwait’s response and ADNOC’s account of the injured and missing crew. GMA News Online
US Energy Information Administration — Pre-war oil and gas flows through the Strait of Hormuz. U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA)
Oman Foreign Ministry — The Iranian president’s message delivered on 17 November. fm.gov.om
Oman Foreign Ministry — Joint statement on restoring navigation through Hormuz. fm.gov.om