Russia’s New Weapon Is Poland’s Old Wound — And Ukraine Is Paying the Price

Moscow Exploits the Volhynia Dispute as Polish Support for Ukraine Falls

Inside the Disinformation Campaign Driving Poland and Ukraine Apart

Russia is accused of dramatically intensifying an online campaign designed to drive Poland and Ukraine apart, exploiting one of the most painful chapters in their shared history. Polish officials and researchers say social-media activity surged after a Ukrainian military unit was named in honour of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, reopening the bitter dispute over the Volhynia massacres.

The danger is not confined to hostile posts or historical arguments. Support for Ukrainian refugees and continued military assistance is falling in Poland, while the country approaches a closely contested parliamentary election in 2027. Moscow denies interfering, but the political outcome Russia wants is clear: a weaker relationship between Ukraine and one of its most important European allies.

The Decision That Reopened the Wound

The immediate crisis began after Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy approved the honorary name “Heroes of the UPA” for a Ukrainian special-operations unit. The Ukrainian Insurgent Army, or UPA, is remembered by many Ukrainians for fighting Soviet and German domination, but in Poland it is inseparable from the mass killing of Polish civilians in Volhynia and Eastern Galicia during the Second World War.

Poland estimates that approximately 100,000 Poles were killed between 1943 and 1945. Thousands of Ukrainians also died in reprisal attacks. These events remain central to Polish historical memory, making the decision to honour the UPA far more explosive than it may have appeared from Kyiv.

Polish President Karol Nawrocki responded in June by revoking Zelenskyy’s Order of the White Eagle, Poland’s highest state honour. Nawrocki insisted that the decision did not represent an abandonment of Ukraine and said Russia remained the aggressor threatening Poland and Europe.

That distinction did little to contain the damage. The argument quickly became a wider test of whether Poland could maintain its strategic support for Ukraine while demanding greater recognition of Polish wartime suffering.

How Russia Is Accused of Amplifying the Crisis

Poland’s Resilience Council warned in July that Russian actors were exploiting Volhynia to provoke hostility between Poles and Ukrainians. It said Russia’s Federal Security Service had released supposedly declassified documents describing alleged atrocities in Volodymyr-Volynskyi, but Polish historians doubted the material’s credibility and concluded that it appeared to combine separate incidents from different places and dates.

The more sophisticated part of the campaign does not always depend on completely fabricated events. Researchers say Russian-linked accounts seize upon genuine decisions, political statements and public anger, then impose the most divisive possible interpretation.

That makes the manipulation harder to counter. A fabricated photograph or invented quotation can be disproved, but a real diplomatic dispute can be repeated endlessly, stripped of context and presented as evidence that Poland and Ukraine are natural enemies.

Analysis by the state-backed Polish Institute of International Affairs found that Polish-language anti-Ukrainian content across major social platforms increased by more than 250 per cent following the military unit controversy. Researchers believe much of that increase was artificially driven by automated accounts designed to make hostility appear broader, faster-growing and more socially acceptable than it really was.

This is influence through volume. If users repeatedly encounter the same grievance across different platforms, they may conclude that it represents an overwhelming public consensus rather than a coordinated amplification effort.

The Anger Is Not Entirely Manufactured

Blaming every hostile opinion on Russia would itself distort the situation. Poland has genuine disputes with Ukraine involving wartime history, agricultural imports, refugee policy and the pressure created by accommodating an estimated 1.8 to 1.9 million Ukrainian migrants.

Polish voters are entitled to debate those issues, criticise Kyiv and demand recognition for historical crimes. The Kremlin’s opportunity comes from attaching its own strategic purpose to arguments that already exist.

This is why the campaign has found what Poland’s deputy digital minister described as fertile ground. Russian influence does not need to invent every grievance when it can identify an authentic political fracture and repeatedly strike it.

The most effective narratives can therefore contain a mixture of truth, omission and manipulation. The historical atrocity is real. The diplomatic dispute is real. The deceptive element lies in presenting the conflict as proof that cooperation between Poland and Ukraine is impossible or contrary to Poland’s national interest.

Polish Support for Ukraine Is Falling

Polling indicates that attitudes have already shifted. One survey found that 33.6 per cent of respondents believed their attitude towards Ukrainians had worsened following the historical dispute.

Another found that support for continued Polish military assistance to Ukraine had fallen to 52 per cent, compared with 78 per cent in 2022. That remains a majority, but the direction of travel matters more than any single figure.

Poland has served as a crucial political, military and logistical partner since Russia launched its full-scale invasion in February 2022. It has received Ukrainian refugees, transferred weapons and provided territory through which international support can reach Ukraine.

A major collapse in Polish public support would therefore carry consequences far beyond Warsaw. It could constrain military assistance, create new obstacles to Ukraine’s European ambitions and weaken the political unity of NATO’s eastern flank.

The 2027 Election Raises the Stakes

Immigration and policy towards Ukraine are expected to feature heavily in Poland’s 2027 parliamentary election. Polling suggests Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s pro-European government could face a difficult fight to remain in power, while parties further to the right seek to convert frustration over migration and historical memory into votes.

Russian information operations do not need to deliver victory to a particular party to succeed. Encouraging bitterness, polarisation and mistrust may be enough to make every Polish government more cautious about supporting Kyiv.

Hostility towards Ukrainians also risks escaping the boundaries of democratic argument. Tusk has called for an end to xenophobic attacks as Ukrainians living in Poland face increasing intimidation.

The central strategic objective is not necessarily to persuade Poles to support Russia. It is to convince enough of them that helping Ukraine has become too expensive, too divisive or too disrespectful to Polish interests.

What Happens Next

Warsaw and Kyiv have formally committed themselves to historical dialogue, education and joint action against disinformation. Their governments also recognise that the security of both countries is linked directly to the outcome of Russia’s war.

That cooperation cannot require Poland to suppress the memory of Volhynia, nor can it survive if Ukraine dismisses Polish grief as an inconvenience. Kyiv’s decision handed Russian propagandists material they did not have to invent, while Russia’s alleged amplification has turned a serious diplomatic dispute into a much broader assault on the alliance.

The next battle will be fought over interpretation as much as evidence. If Poland and Ukraine cannot discuss the past without allowing it to dictate their future, Moscow may achieve through algorithms, repetition and anger what it has failed to achieve on the battlefield: separating Ukraine from the neighbour that helped keep it connected to Europe.