The Ukraine War After Four Years: Who Is Actually Winning And How Does It End?

The Ukraine War Explained: Territory, Death Toll, Nuclear Risk And What Happens Next

Russia Is Winning The Ukraine War — But The Price Of Victory Is Becoming Extraordinary

Russia invaded Ukraine expecting a campaign that could potentially topple the government in Kyiv within days. More than four years later, Kyiv remains Ukrainian, NATO is larger, European military spending has surged and Russia has suffered losses on a scale few governments would willingly contemplate. Yet one uncomfortable fact has also become increasingly difficult to ignore: on the battlefield, Russia currently holds the stronger position.

Moscow controls roughly a fifth of internationally recognised Ukrainian territory when Crimea and the areas of Donbas seized before February 2022 are included. Its forces retain the initiative across important sections of the front, while Ukraine is increasingly fighting a war defined by manpower pressure, shortages of air-defence ammunition and dependence on continued Western support. Russia therefore appears to be ahead — but that is very different from saying Russia has won.

Who Is Actually Winning The Ukraine War?

Measured purely by territory, Russia is winning.

Assessments based on frontline mapping put Russian control at approximately 19–20% of Ukraine. Since the full-scale invasion began on 24 February 2022, Russia has gained roughly another 12% of Ukrainian territory beyond Crimea and the parts of the Donbas it already controlled. That represents approximately 45,000 square miles — around 117,000 square kilometres — currently under Russian control in total.

But wars are not decided by coloured areas on a map alone. Russia's original operation failed spectacularly in one of its most important objectives: Ukrainian political collapse never happened. Russian troops withdrew from northern Ukraine after failing to capture Kyiv, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy remained in office and Ukraine survived as an independent state.

Ukraine subsequently retook substantial territory around Kharkiv and Kherson during 2022. Even in 2026, Kyiv says its forces have recovered hundreds of square kilometres in counterattacks. Zelenskyy said in August that approximately 745 square kilometres had been reclaimed during the year, while Russian forces continued making gains elsewhere.

The deeper picture is therefore more complicated. Russia is presently winning the contest for battlefield initiative and territory. Ukraine has so far won the larger battle for national survival. Neither has achieved the political outcome it ultimately wants.

How Much Ukrainian Land Has Russia Taken?

The scale becomes easier to understand when Crimea is separated from territory captured since 2022.

Russia annexed Crimea in 2014 and Russian-backed separatists already controlled parts of Donetsk and Luhansk before the full-scale invasion. Since February 2022, Russian forces have added roughly 28,000–29,000 square miles of Ukrainian territory to that earlier footprint.

The combined occupation is now approximately 19–20% of Ukraine.

That is enormous in absolute terms, but it also demonstrates how dramatically Russian expectations changed. At the beginning of the invasion, Russian forces attacked towards Kyiv, Kharkiv, Chernihiv, Sumy, southern Ukraine and the Donbas simultaneously. Much of that initial penetration was subsequently lost.

The frontline has instead hardened into a vast fortified belt dominated by trenches, mines, artillery, electronic warfare and drones. Recent territorial changes can be measured in tens of square kilometres rather than the enormous advances seen during the opening weeks.

This is increasingly an attritional war in which capturing relatively small areas can consume thousands of soldiers, enormous quantities of ammunition and months of fighting.

The Death Toll Is Already Staggering

There is no reliable single figure for the number of people killed in the Ukraine war.

Anyone presenting an exact total should therefore be treated cautiously.

Ukraine said in February 2026 that approximately 55,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed on the battlefield, while acknowledging that many personnel remained missing. Independent verification of Ukrainian military deaths is difficult because wartime governments have strong reasons to restrict information about their own casualties.

Russian losses appear substantially greater.

By August 2026, researchers working from death notices, official records, relatives' posts and other publicly verifiable evidence had identified more than 236,000 Russian military personnel killed. That is a confirmed-name count rather than an estimate of the true number, and it does not capture every Russian death or all personnel fighting alongside Russian forces.

Broader estimates put total Russian battlefield casualties — killed, wounded or missing — above 1.4 million. That figure should not be confused with deaths, but it illustrates the extraordinary attrition Moscow has absorbed while continuing to recruit replacement personnel.

Civilians have also paid an enormous price. UN monitors had verified 15,578 civilians killed by the end of March 2026. Another 238 were verified killed in April, 274 in May, 293 in June and 437 in July, bringing the verified figure through July to at least 16,820 civilian deaths since the full-scale invasion. The real total is believed to be considerably higher, particularly because deaths in occupied territory and during the destruction of cities such as Mariupol are difficult to document comprehensively.

Taken together, publicly documented figures already create a defensible minimum of more than 300,000 military and civilian deaths. The real number is almost certainly substantially above that.

The Moments That Changed The War

The first defining moment was Russia's failure to take Kyiv.

Russian airborne forces attempted to seize Hostomel airport while armoured formations pushed south from Belarus. Ukraine resisted, Russian logistics struggled and Moscow eventually abandoned the northern offensive. The war Russia appeared to expect to finish quickly instead became the largest sustained European conflict since the Second World War.

The second turning point was Mariupol. After a devastating siege, Russian forces captured the city in May 2022, creating a more secure land corridor linking Russian-held Donbas with occupied Crimea.

Then came Ukraine's extraordinary Kharkiv counteroffensive in September 2022. Ukrainian forces punched through thin Russian defensive lines and liberated thousands of square kilometres in days. Russia subsequently withdrew from the western bank of the Dnipro at Kherson, handing Ukraine another major victory.

The war then changed character.

The battle for Bakhmut became a symbol of attrition. Russia eventually captured the devastated city in 2023, but only after months of extraordinarily costly fighting dominated by Wagner mercenaries and Russian regular forces. Months later, Wagner leader Yevgeny Prigozhin launched an armed mutiny against Russia's military leadership before abruptly stopping his forces short of Moscow. He died in a plane crash two months later.

Ukraine's major 2023 counteroffensive then failed to achieve the breakthrough Kyiv and its supporters hoped for. Dense minefields, prepared Russian defences, artillery and attack helicopters helped prevent Ukraine from severing Russia's land bridge towards Crimea.

Russia captured Avdiivka in February 2024, and pressure subsequently grew across the eastern front.

Ukraine produced another surprise in August 2024 by crossing the border into Russia's Kursk region. For the first time since the Second World War, substantial foreign forces occupied internationally recognised Russian territory. The operation embarrassed Moscow and forced Russia to divert resources, although it never fundamentally reversed the overall direction of the war.

By 2025 and 2026, the conflict had become something different again: the world's most intensive laboratory for drone warfare.

The Drone Has Changed Modern War

Ukraine now offers a disturbing preview of what future industrial wars could look like.

Reconnaissance drones continuously watch enormous stretches of the battlefield. First-person-view attack drones pursue individual vehicles and soldiers. Fibre-optic drones bypass some electronic jamming. Larger unmanned systems attack infrastructure hundreds or even thousands of kilometres behind the frontline.

This has created what soldiers increasingly describe as a kill zone extending many kilometres behind the traditional front. Movement that would once have been routine — driving a truck, moving ammunition or rotating troops — can now expose a unit to almost immediate attack.

Ukraine has simultaneously expanded deep strikes against Russian oil facilities, logistics infrastructure and military-industrial targets. Russia has responded with increasingly large combinations of drones, cruise missiles and ballistic weapons against Ukrainian cities and infrastructure.

The result is that there is increasingly no clean distinction between the frontline and the rear.

Russia's Biggest Advantage May Be Endurance

Russia's population is more than three times Ukraine's. Its industrial base is larger. It possesses far greater domestic energy resources and has reorganised substantial parts of its economy around war production.

That does not mean its resources are unlimited.

The scale of Russian casualties is creating recruitment pressure, and replacing hundreds of thousands of killed or seriously wounded soldiers indefinitely carries enormous demographic, economic and political consequences. Russia has relied heavily on large signing bonuses and financial incentives to maintain recruitment while trying to avoid another politically dangerous mass mobilisation.

Ukraine's problem is harsher because its available population is substantially smaller.

Every Ukrainian soldier lost therefore matters proportionally more. Kyiv must simultaneously defend a roughly 1,000-kilometre frontline, protect cities from air attack and maintain enough forces to threaten Russian positions.

That is why Western assistance matters so much.

Russia needs to outlast Ukraine.

Ukraine needs to prevent Russia from outlasting its supporters.

The Nuclear Threat Has Never Completely Disappeared

The possibility of Russia using nuclear weapons remains low, but it cannot responsibly be described as zero.

Moscow possesses the world's largest or one of the world's two largest nuclear arsenals and has repeatedly used nuclear signalling during the conflict. Russia formally revised its nuclear doctrine in November 2024, setting out circumstances under which nuclear weapons could potentially be used.

Russian officials describe the arsenal as deterrence. NATO has repeatedly accused Moscow of irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive signalling, while maintaining its own nuclear deterrent posture.

Russian hardliners have periodically advocated tactical nuclear use against Ukraine, especially following successful Ukrainian attacks inside Russia. Yet the Kremlin has so far resisted those demands.

There are powerful reasons for restraint. Nuclear use could trigger unpredictable Western military retaliation, destroy Russia's remaining relationships with important non-Western partners, cross a threshold that has held since 1945 and produce radioactive consequences Russia itself could not fully control.

The more immediate nuclear danger may therefore be miscalculation rather than deliberate strategic nuclear war.

A strike incorrectly interpreted as something larger, an attack involving nuclear command infrastructure, an incident involving NATO territory or a serious accident at a nuclear facility could create an escalation chain neither side originally intended.

Ukraine Is Also Facing An Air-Defence Crisis

Perhaps the most dangerous immediate weakness for Ukraine is not the movement of the frontline but what is happening above it.

Russia has dramatically expanded long-range attacks using drones and multiple classes of missiles. Ukraine can destroy large numbers of conventional drones and cruise missiles, but ballistic weapons are much harder to intercept.

That makes systems such as Patriot particularly important.

The consequences have become visible during 2026. UN monitors recorded 437 Ukrainian civilian deaths during July alone, the highest monthly figure since May 2022.

On 19–20 August, another enormous Russian barrage struck Kyiv and surrounding areas. At least 16 people were reported killed and more than 40 wounded as residential and civilian buildings were damaged. Ukraine again warned that shortages of advanced interceptors were leaving cities exposed.

If Ukraine cannot replenish sophisticated air-defence ammunition, Russia does not necessarily need to break through the entire frontline to increase pressure dramatically. It can attack electricity generation, industry, logistics, cities and public morale from the air.

Why A Peace Agreement Remains So Difficult

The fundamental problem is remarkably simple.

The two sides remain too far apart.

Russia wants recognition of territorial and strategic changes created by the war and continues to pursue additional battlefield objectives. Ukraine cannot easily surrender territory containing Ukrainian citizens after paying such an enormous price defending it.

Security guarantees create another problem.

Kyiv fears that a ceasefire without credible guarantees could simply give Russia time to rebuild before attacking again. Moscow, meanwhile, has consistently opposed Ukraine becoming embedded militarily within the Western alliance system.

Diplomatic activity has continued intermittently. Ukraine submitted new proposals to American mediators in August 2026, and prisoner exchanges continue even while broader negotiations remain stalled.

But battlefield behaviour currently provides little evidence that Moscow believes the military option has been exhausted. Russian officials rejected a proposed limited Black Sea ceasefire in August, while Russian forces continued offensive operations.

What Is Most Likely To Happen Next?

The most probable outcome is not a dramatic Russian conquest of Kyiv or an equally dramatic Ukrainian liberation of Crimea.

It is continued attrition.

Russia is likely to keep attempting relatively limited advances in eastern and southeastern Ukraine while using drones and missiles to exhaust Ukrainian infrastructure and air defences. Ukraine will continue trying to impose asymmetric costs through drones, strikes against Russian oil infrastructure, attacks on logistics and local counterattacks.

The decisive variable may increasingly become industrial rather than tactical.

How many soldiers can Russia recruit?

How many drones can each side manufacture?

How many ballistic missiles can Russia produce?

How many Patriot interceptors and other air-defence weapons can Ukraine obtain?

And perhaps most importantly: how long will Europe and the United States maintain the financial and military effort required to keep Ukraine fighting?

A negotiated ceasefire remains possible, particularly if both countries conclude that additional offensives cannot substantially improve their positions. But a ceasefire would probably resemble an armed frozen conflict rather than a true peace settlement. The territorial dispute would remain unresolved and both countries would have powerful incentives to rearm.

So Who Is Winning?

As of August 2026, Russia is ahead.

It controls approximately one fifth of Ukraine, holds the greater pool of manpower and resources, possesses the battlefield initiative in several important sectors and can sustain enormous levels of missile and drone attack.

But Russia has still failed to achieve the transformational victory implied by its invasion in February 2022.

Ukraine remains independent. Kyiv was never captured. The Ukrainian government survived. Most of the country remains outside Russian control. NATO expanded rather than retreated. Finland and Sweden joined the alliance. European states are rearming. Russia has suffered hundreds of thousands of deaths and casualties while turning what was expected to be a rapid campaign into a generational conflict.

That is why the most accurate verdict is not that Russia has won.

Russia is currently winning a war that neither side appears capable of decisively winning.

And that may be the darkest conclusion after more than four years of fighting. The military technology has changed, the frontlines have moved and hundreds of thousands of people have died, yet the central political contradiction that produced the war remains unresolved. Unless that changes, 2027 may begin with Russian and Ukrainian soldiers still fighting over many of the same fields their armies were contesting years earlier.