US To Reveal Exactly What It Will Do To Iran On Monday — And The Target May Be Much Bigger Than Tehran

Will the US attack Iran again?

Trump’s ‘Economic D-Day’ For Iran Is Coming Monday — Here’s What

The United States is preparing to reveal the next phase of its confrontation with Iran on Monday, 24 August, after months of warfare, abortive ceasefires and negotiations that have repeatedly failed to produce a permanent settlement. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent has confirmed that he will hold a press conference explaining Washington's forthcoming measures, while President Donald Trump has promised what he describes as an unprecedented campaign of economic pressure.

The critical point is that Monday is unlikely to be primarily about another wave of American airstrikes. Everything Washington has signalled so far suggests that the next weapon will be financial: an effort not merely to sanction Iran, but to make continued economic cooperation with Iran increasingly painful for governments, banks, refiners, shipping companies and businesses elsewhere in the world.

That could make the announcement far more internationally consequential than another conventional sanctions package. Iran has lived under American sanctions for decades. The bigger question is whether Washington is now prepared to punish the rest of the world for helping Tehran circumvent them.

What Is America Likely To Announce On Monday?

The most probable announcement is a dramatic expansion of the existing US Economic Fury campaign. Treasury has already been targeting Iran's oil exports, cryptocurrency networks, foreign-exchange channels, front companies, shadow banking infrastructure, weapons procurement operations and the vessels used to disguise Iranian trade.

The next stage appears designed to move further outside Iran itself.

Trump has threatened serious consequences for countries that financially or commercially support Tehran, while Bessent has conspicuously refused to rule out consequences for China. That matters because China is central to Iran's remaining oil trade, and Treasury has already explicitly identified Chinese and Hong Kong-based companies and financial networks while warning that foreign financial institutions connected to Chinese independent refiners could face secondary sanctions.

Secondary sanctions are potentially devastating because they force companies to make a choice. A bank, shipping company or refinery may technically operate outside US jurisdiction, but Washington can effectively tell it: continue dealing with sanctioned Iranian interests and risk losing access to the American financial system.

The dollar's central role in international banking gives that threat enormous reach.

Monday could therefore bring new designations against foreign refiners buying Iranian crude, shipping businesses transporting it, banks processing the payments and intermediaries disguising the transactions. Cryptocurrency and exchange networks are another obvious target because Washington has increasingly focused on Iran's attempts to move money outside conventional banking channels.

There could also be tighter enforcement against Iran's so-called shadow fleet and companies that disguise the origin of Iranian petroleum. Treasury has already documented networks using foreign companies, bank accounts and falsified cargo origins to move Iranian energy products into Asian markets.

The more aggressive possibility would be something approaching a financial ultimatum to major Iranian trading partners: significantly reduce commercial links with Tehran or face escalating American penalties.

That would explain Trump's extraordinary language. Ordinary additions to a sanctions list would hardly justify portraying Monday as the beginning of the most severe economic offensive ever attempted against another state.

China Could Be The Real Test

China is where Trump's threat becomes geopolitically dangerous.

Iran can be isolated relatively easily from Western finance because much of that isolation already exists. China is different. It is the world's second-largest economy, a major holder of American assets, an enormous trading partner of the United States and an essential buyer and processor of global energy.

Treasury has already targeted networks associated with Iranian oil shipments to China and has explicitly warned about foreign financial institutions connected to Chinese independent refiners.

If Monday's announcement threatens substantial penalties against Chinese companies merely for purchasing Iranian energy, the Iran conflict would begin crossing into the US-China economic relationship.

That creates a dilemma for Beijing. Defying Washington could preserve an important strategic relationship with Tehran and demonstrate that American sanctions cannot dictate Chinese energy policy. But escalating the dispute could also threaten Chinese access to dollar-based finance or complicate wider economic relations with the United States.

Bessent has already pointed to China's dependence on Gulf energy when discussing the coming campaign.

That may be the underlying strategy: make Iran's international supporters conclude that Tehran is no longer economically worth defending.

Why Has A Deal Still Not Been Reached?

Because Washington and Tehran are no longer arguing about a narrow ceasefire.

They are arguing about the basic strategic order of the Gulf.

A memorandum signed on 17 June was supposed to create a path towards a broader settlement within 60 days. That deadline expired on 17 August without an agreement, after both governments had already effectively declared the framework broken.

The Strait of Hormuz sits at the centre of the dispute.

Iran maintains that the waterway will remain closed until Washington meets what Tehran considers its obligations under the June framework. Iranian demands include lifting the American blockade of Iranian ports, removing oil sanctions, releasing frozen Iranian assets and ending military operations and threats.

Washington fundamentally rejects that interpretation.

Trump says the US naval blockade remains in operation while simultaneously claiming the Strait is open and functioning. Tehran says the Strait remains closed unless its conditions are met. As recently as 18 August, Trump said there were no negotiations with Iran underway and none scheduled.

Then there is the nuclear issue.

Trump continues to insist that Iran must never obtain a nuclear weapon, while the wider negotiations have involved the future of Tehran's nuclear programme as well as control of Hormuz, sanctions and military operations.

Neither side wants to be seen surrendering.

For Washington, accepting Iranian control over access to one of the world's most important energy corridors would look like a major strategic defeat after months of military operations.

For Tehran, reopening the Strait and surrendering its leverage without major sanctions relief could leave Iran economically weakened while giving away perhaps its most powerful bargaining tool.

Both governments therefore want the other side to make the first significant concession.

Neither has.

Iran Is Now Threatening To Go On The Offensive

The collapse of diplomacy is becoming more dangerous because Tehran is no longer merely warning that it will resist American pressure.

A senior Iranian official has said Iran could adopt a "fully offensive" military posture and conduct precise attacks intended to break the US naval blockade if diplomacy fails.

The warning comes amid continuing instability around Hormuz and attacks on commercial shipping.

The United Arab Emirates has accused Iran of firing missiles towards its territory and has halted trade and financial transactions with Iran, although Tehran has denied responsibility for the missile attack.

That creates a dangerous feedback loop.

Iran applies military pressure to maintain leverage over Hormuz. Washington responds by tightening its blockade and sanctions. Gulf countries move closer to the American economic campaign. Iran sees that as further encirclement and retaliates.

Each side then points to the other's action as justification for its own.

This is one reason the conflict has proved so difficult to terminate.

How Many People Have Died?

There is no reliable single current death toll for the entire conflict, and any precise number presented as definitive in August would be misleading.

The casualty picture is unusually difficult to establish because different governments and monitoring groups use different definitions, communications inside Iran have repeatedly been disrupted and fighting has continued after earlier casualty assessments were published.

Independent estimates were already enormous during the first phase of the war.

One Iranian human-rights organisation estimated at least 7,650 deaths inside Iran during the first 40 days, including at least 1,030 civilians, while another independent monitoring project later documented at least 1,701 civilian deaths between 28 February and 8 April. These figures cannot simply be added together because the datasets overlap and use different methodologies.

An earlier consolidated assessment published on 31 March put the regional death toll above 5,100, including between approximately 1,900 and 3,546 deaths in Iran at that stage, as well as deaths in Lebanon, Iraq, Israel and several Gulf states.

Those figures are now months old.

Since then, further American, Israeli and Iranian operations have occurred, along with attacks across several regional fronts. The safest conclusion as of 20 August is therefore that thousands of people have been killed and the eventual verified total will be higher than the early-war counts, but there is currently no authoritative independently verified August figure covering every combatant and civilian death.

American losses are clearer. Pentagon data updated on 19 August indicate 18 US service members have died and 757 have been wounded in casualties associated with the Iran conflict.

The lack of a dependable overall tally after almost six months of conflict is itself significant. It demonstrates how difficult it has become to establish the full human cost of a war conducted across Iran, the Gulf and several neighbouring states.

What Life Is Becoming Like For Ordinary Iranians

Whatever Monday's measures achieve strategically, their impact will increasingly be felt by people far removed from Iran's military leadership.

Iran was already heavily sanctioned before the current war. Fighting, infrastructure damage, disruption of trade and the American blockade have compounded those problems.

By July, Iranian inflation had reportedly reached approximately 66%, while food prices were running around 128% higher and the rial had continued losing value. Ordinary families have described cutting meat and other increasingly unaffordable products from household spending.

That makes further economic pressure a double-edged weapon.

Washington's theory is straightforward. Starve the Iranian state of oil revenue, foreign currency and access to international finance until maintaining the confrontation becomes more painful than reaching an agreement.

But sanctions do not operate exclusively on governments.

A collapsing currency makes imported goods more expensive. Financial isolation affects businesses. Reduced trade damages employment. Fuel, medicine and food distribution can become more difficult even where humanitarian goods are formally exempt.

The United Nations has already warned that continued hostilities threaten the movement of essential goods including food and medicine.

There is also a political calculation behind the pressure.

Iran experienced major internal unrest before the war, and deteriorating economic conditions have reportedly increased concern inside the leadership about another wave of protests. The government has simultaneously strengthened parts of its security apparatus and made personnel changes as officials prepare for potential domestic instability.

Washington may therefore believe economic pressure attacks two vulnerabilities simultaneously: Iran's ability to finance military operations and its ability to maintain domestic stability.

That strategy carries obvious risks.

Economic suffering does not automatically produce political surrender. It can instead strengthen nationalist sentiment, increase hostility towards the country imposing the sanctions and give Tehran another justification for internal repression.

The Most Likely Outcome

The highest-probability immediate outcome is not peace and not an unrestricted new American air campaign.

It is a harder economic siege combined with continuing military deterrence.

Washington is likely to tighten sanctions against Iran's oil, banking, shipping and sanctions-evasion networks while threatening foreign companies with secondary penalties. The US military presence and blockade would remain the coercive force behind that campaign.

The objective would be to create a choice for Tehran: reopen serious negotiations or watch the economic cost continue rising.

There is perhaps a 40% probability that renewed pressure eventually pushes both sides back towards meaningful negotiations without a major new escalation. Neither country currently appears eager to absorb the cost of an indefinite war, and the disruption of Hormuz gives outside powers enormous incentives to broker a settlement.

A second scenario — perhaps 30% — is a prolonged frozen conflict. America continues sanctions and military containment, Iran retains enough influence over Hormuz to keep shipping dangerous, sporadic attacks continue and neither side achieves decisive victory.

The most worrying scenario, perhaps 20%, is renewed major military escalation. An Iranian attack that kills significant numbers of Americans, a serious strike against Gulf infrastructure or an attempt to break the naval blockade could trigger another large US campaign.

The remaining possibility is a faster political or economic break inside Iran. That probability is harder to quantify. Severe inflation, falling living standards and accumulated war damage certainly increase domestic pressure, but predicting regime collapse from economic distress has repeatedly proved unreliable.

Monday May Be About More Than Iran

The most important part of Monday's announcement may ultimately be who Washington threatens outside Iran.

If Bessent unveils another list of Iranian officials, ships and front companies, the escalation will be significant but familiar.

If he announces sweeping secondary sanctions against foreign banks, Chinese refiners, shipping companies or governments that facilitate Iranian commerce, the calculation changes.

Trump would effectively be attempting to internationalise America's economic blockade: forcing countries to decide whether preserving commercial relations with Iran is worth jeopardising access to the world's largest economy and its financial system.

That could weaken Tehran far more dramatically than another isolated sanctions package.

It could also widen the confrontation.

China, Russia and other states have strategic reasons to resist the principle that Washington can determine with whom they trade. Excessive secondary sanctions could accelerate attempts to conduct international commerce outside the dollar system and deepen the geopolitical division between American-led and anti-American economic blocs.

That is the paradox facing Washington.

The enormous power of the dollar makes America's financial weapons extraordinarily effective. Using those weapons too aggressively also gives America's rivals another reason to build alternatives to them.

Monday will therefore reveal more than the next step in Trump's confrontation with Iran.

It will reveal whether Washington still believes Tehran itself is the target — or whether the strategy has shifted towards making the entire international economy choose sides.