Why Is the Trump–Xi–Putin Summit Being Compared With Yalta?

Why Does Zelenskyy Fear a Second Yalta When Trump, Xi and Putin Meet?

Why One Word From 1945 Still Haunts Ukraine Before the Shenzhen Summit

At Yalta, Three Leaders Discussed China’s Future Without A Chinese Leader In The Room.

In February 1945, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin signed an agreement covering two Chinese ports and the railways that served them. China’s leader, Chiang Kai-shek, would be asked for his consent afterwards. On Thursday 19 November 2026, the Chinese president will be the one receiving his American and Russian counterparts in Shenzhen. This time, it is Ukraine’s president who has warned about what three leaders might decide in someone else’s absence.

That is why Donald Trump’s meeting with Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin has drawn comparisons with Yalta. The wartime conference became shorthand for powerful countries settling questions of borders, governments and security on behalf of people who had little say in the bargain. Volodymyr Zelenskyy has invoked that history explicitly. The Kremlin has publicly rejected the comparison. And although Beijing has confirmed the meeting, it has announced no agreement on Ukraine or even confirmed that Ukraine will be on the agenda.

What Did Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin Agree at Yalta?

The three leaders met in Crimea from 4 to 11 February 1945. Germany was still fighting. Soviet troops had taken Warsaw and were advancing towards Berlin. The United States was preparing for the prospect of prolonged fighting against Japan. Each delegation brought questions that the other two could help answer. Who would occupy Germany? Would the Soviet Union enter the Pacific war? Could the Allies agree on how a new United Nations Security Council would work?

Poland exposed the limits of their agreement. Britain had entered the war in September 1939 after Germany invaded Poland. By the time Churchill arrived at Yalta, the Red Army held Warsaw and a Soviet-backed provisional government was already operating. Britain still recognised the Polish government-in-exile in London. The Polish people had endured more than five years of occupation, yet no Polish leader sat alongside the three men discussing which government would represent them.

The wording they adopted is worth reading closely. They agreed that Poland’s eastern frontier should broadly follow the Curzon Line, leaving much of pre-war eastern Poland on the Soviet side. Poland was to gain territory to the north and west. The three also called for the provisional government to include a wider range of Polish leaders and pledged it to hold “free and unfettered elections” by secret ballot.

Those promises had very different prospects of being honoured. Soviet troops were in a position to enforce the territorial settlement. A Polish voter had no comparable means of enforcing the promise of a free ballot. When parliamentary elections took place in January 1947, the communist authorities falsified the result. For generations of Poles, that sequence gave Yalta a meaning no photograph of the three smiling Allies could convey.

Why China Has Its Own Reason to Remember Yalta

The agreement on the war against Japan offers an especially close parallel to the question Kyiv is asking today. Roosevelt wanted the Soviet Union to attack Japan once Germany had surrendered. Stalin agreed to enter the war within two or three months, subject to conditions that included restoring the Soviet lease on Port Arthur as a naval base and safeguarding Soviet interests at the commercial port of Dairen, now Dalian.

Both ports were in China. The agreement acknowledged that provisions affecting Chinese interests required Chiang Kai-shek’s concurrence. Roosevelt undertook to obtain it. By then, however, the American, British and Soviet leaders had signed a text specifying what they wanted him to accept.

There is a considerable difference between helping write a proposal and being invited to approve one. A government consulted at the outset can suggest different terms, decide which questions belong together or walk away from a bad trade. A government approached afterwards has to weigh the cost of unravelling an understanding its allies have already reached. China knew that predicament in 1945. Xi now hosts a meeting at which another country could conceivably face it.

Why Has Zelenskyy Warned Against Another Yalta?

In October, Zelenskyy said he did not want the proposed talks to become “Yalta 2, 3, 4”, with powerful states redistributing influence. The wartime conference took place in Crimea, Ukrainian territory that Russia seized and claimed to annex in 2014. For a Ukrainian audience, the name of the conference is also the name of a place whose future remains in dispute.

The danger Kyiv sees can arise well before anyone signs a treaty. Imagine Washington and Moscow agreeing privately on where a ceasefire line should run. Even if Kyiv could refuse, it would then have to persuade its principal military backer to reopen a question the American president considered settled. The diplomatic pressure would come from the order in which the conversations took place. That is a hypothetical example. As of 17 November, no such understanding has been announced in connection with Shenzhen.

The participants have also differed over whether Ukraine belongs on the agenda at all. Ahead of the summit, Moscow wanted the leaders to discuss the war. People briefed on the preparations said Beijing had resisted putting it on the programme. An American official also questioned whether this three-way meeting was the right place for that conversation. Those differences matter when assessing claims that Shenzhen is about to produce a peace settlement. Getting three presidents into a room has proved easier than establishing what they want to do there.

Why Does the Kremlin Reject the Comparison?

On Monday, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov dismissed the Yalta analogy as the “games of political scientists”. He said Russia and China favoured a world with several centres of power and rejected the idea that they intended to decide other countries’ futures. He also called the forthcoming meeting unusually important. Moscow plainly sees significance in the occasion while disputing the interpretation Kyiv places on it.

Beijing has offered its own reason for holding the talks. Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Mao Ning described Shenzhen as the first face-to-face meeting among the heads of state of China, Russia and the United States. She argued that direct communication could help the three manage their differences. When asked specifically about nuclear arms control and Iran, she said the leaders would discuss matters affecting global peace and left the detailed agenda open.

On nuclear weapons, there is an obvious reason for these particular presidents to speak directly. Each has authority over his own country’s nuclear policy. A conversation about how their governments could reduce the risk of a misunderstanding would concern decisions each could take at home. A conversation about which Ukrainian territory Kyiv should relinquish would ask something quite different of the country missing from the table.

Where Does the Yalta Analogy Break Down?

Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin spent eight days bargaining as wartime allies. Their armies were closing in on a common enemy. They had officials working on occupation arrangements, frontiers and the terms of Soviet entry into another war. The resulting documents were specific enough to name ports, identify a proposed frontier and set a timetable for military action.

Trump, Xi and Putin are due to meet on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific economic summit. Their governments have competing interests, and Beijing’s announcement commits them to a conversation. A useful discussion could still follow. So could a disagreement sharp enough to explain why their officials struggled to settle an agenda. Neither outcome would amount to a second Yalta.

One detail in the 1945 text offers a better way to judge Thursday’s meeting than the inevitable photographs. After setting out the broad direction of Poland’s territorial gains, the three leaders wrote that the opinion of a future Polish government should be sought “in due course”. Those three words tell us when the people most affected were expected to enter the discussion.

After Shenzhen, listen for the equivalent detail. If the leaders mention Ukraine, do they describe proposals that Kyiv helped develop? Do they invite Ukraine to negotiate questions that remain open? Or do they announce terms and then ask what Kyiv thinks? Of everything said in Crimea eighty-one years ago, that distinction is the one most worth carrying into Thursday.

Sources

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