Trump–Netanyahu meeting in Florida raises the stakes for phase two of the Gaza plan
As of December 30, 2025, President Donald Trump and Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu have put the next stage of the Gaza plan front and centre after meeting in Florida. The ceasefire’s first phase has mostly held, but stage two is where temporary truces either become a durable arrangement—or unravel.
The tension is sequencing. Washington is pushing for the second phase to begin quickly. Israel is signalling that disarmament cannot be postponed. Hamas is resisting any step that looks like surrender while trying to preserve leverage through the hostages and control on the ground.
This piece lays out what phase two is designed to do, where the leverage points sit, and what practical signals would show progress beyond rhetoric.
The story turns on whether enforcement and political transition can move in parallel, rather than as a winner-takes-first demand.
Key Points
Trump and Netanyahu met at Mar-a-Lago in Palm Beach with phase two of the Gaza plan as the headline issue.
Phase two is built around four linked moves: Hamas disarmament and exit from governance, further Israeli withdrawal, a Palestinian technocratic administration, and an international security presence.
Israel is tying forward movement to unresolved hostage steps, including the return of remains still believed to be in Gaza.
Hamas has refused to disarm and has sought to reassert control, while Israel has kept forces in substantial parts of the territory.
The international force concept remains the plan’s biggest question mark: its mandate, troop contributors, and enforcement rules are not settled.
The meeting also folded Gaza into a wider regional frame, with Iran and third-country roles discussed alongside ceasefire mechanics.
Background: The Trump–Netanyahu meeting and the Gaza plan
The current framework follows an October 2025 ceasefire that was meant to stop large-scale fighting, expand aid flows, and enable hostage-for-prisoner exchanges. It was a stabilisation phase, not an end state.
Phase two is intended to settle the core political question: who governs Gaza, who holds the guns, and who guarantees security if Israel pulls back further. In outline, the plan points toward a demilitarised Gaza, a Palestinian technocratic body handling day-to-day administration, and an international stabilisation or peacekeeping layer tasked with maintaining security and preventing armed groups from rebuilding.
That architecture is difficult because each element depends on the others. Donors are unlikely to fund reconstruction without credible security and governance. A technocratic administration cannot function without basic security and access. And disarmament is nearly impossible without a political horizon that persuades militants they are not simply laying down arms to be removed later.
Analysis
Political and Geopolitical Dimensions
The Florida meeting matters less for what was announced and more for what it implies: Trump is positioning himself as the central broker and enforcer of phase two, not merely its sponsor. That increases pressure on Netanyahu to show cooperation, while also increasing Trump’s ownership if the plan stalls.
Israel’s public stance, as reinforced around the meeting, is that phase two must end with Hamas disarmed and no longer governing Gaza. The Israeli government is also emphasising hostages as the immediate test of good faith, using a clear, emotionally resonant metric that plays strongly at home.
Hamas’s incentives cut the other way. Disarmament is existential for an armed movement; it removes deterrence, internal control, and bargaining power. Even if Hamas were willing to accept reduced political visibility, it has reason to delay irreversible steps unless it believes the alternative is worse—and unless it sees a credible pathway that does not simply hand Gaza to a hostile security regime.
The result is a bargaining structure where each side demands the other “go first.” Phase two will only move if the steps can be staged in small, verifiable increments that still look meaningful to domestic audiences.
Social and Cultural Fallout
Hostage politics remain the emotional engine on the Israeli side. Any phase-two package that cannot credibly deliver remaining hostages, including the dead, will struggle to maintain legitimacy across Israel’s political spectrum. That is why hostage-related conditions are being used as a gate to the next steps.
In Gaza, the social pressure runs through daily survival rather than symbolism. For civilians, phase two is not a diplomatic blueprint—it is whether crossings function, whether rebuilding materials arrive, whether policing prevents predation, and whether families can return to stable housing. A plan that increases security constraints without improving normal life will fail in the court that matters most: public endurance.
Across the wider region, legitimacy is the scarce resource. Arab governments may be willing to help finance and staff a transition only if the governance arrangement is visibly Palestinian and the security mission is limited, legal, and time-bounded. Otherwise, participation risks looking like complicity in indefinite control.
Technological and Security Implications
“Disarmament” sounds simple until it becomes operational. It implies weapons collection, border control, monitoring of tunnels and smuggling routes, intelligence fusion, and a clear escalation ladder when violations occur. Without agreed verification and enforcement, phase two becomes an argument about narratives rather than compliance.
That is why the international force is the plan’s hardest engineering problem. A weak force is symbolic and easily bypassed. A strong force tasked with disarming militants risks being seen as an occupation by another name—and would become a target for violence.
The mandate question also affects who will actually contribute personnel. Countries asked to send troops will weigh legal exposure, domestic politics, and the risk of being pulled into open-ended counterinsurgency. Even if leaders agree on paper, the force cannot exist until rules of engagement, command structure, and political cover are nailed down.
What Most Coverage Misses
Phase two is often framed as a straight sequence: ceasefire first, politics second. In reality, phase two is a three-part lock that must turn together—security, governance, and money. If any one lags, the other two become impossible to sustain.
The overlooked leverage point is not a speech or a summit. It is the mundane control of access: crossings, inspections, fuel, building materials, and permissions. Those mechanisms decide whether a technocratic administration can function, whether reconstruction is real, and whether the international force is stabilising daily life or merely patrolling a crisis.
This is why the Florida meeting matters even without a detailed rollout. It signals a push to align those levers—and a readiness to shift blame if alignment fails.
Why This Matters
In the short term, phase two will determine whether the ceasefire holds into 2026 as a managed transition or degrades into tit-for-tat violations that eventually snap. It will also determine whether humanitarian access becomes predictable or remains hostage to political conditions.
In the long term, Gaza becomes a test case for conflict “endgames” across the region: whether international supervision can credibly replace armed governance, and whether reconstruction can be insulated from rearmament cycles. Failure would harden the belief that postwar governance is impossible without either reoccupation or the survival of heavily armed factions.
Watch for concrete, operational signals: movement at key crossings; an agreed roster for the technocratic administration; a published mandate for the international force that troop contributors can sign up to; and verified steps on hostages and weapons that both sides acknowledge as real.
Real-World Impact
A logistics coordinator near the Gaza–Egypt border watches rules change by the day. For her, phase two means whether fuel is allowed through consistently and whether building materials are approved without sudden reversals.
An Israeli family waiting for news about a hostage focuses on a single question: is the process producing returns, or just more meetings. Their tolerance for risk shrinks as time passes, even if the broader plan looks rational on paper.
A small shop owner in Gaza City tries to reopen with damaged infrastructure and uncertain supplies. He does not need grand declarations. He needs predictable access, basic security on the street, and confidence that rebuilding will not be undone by the next round of fighting.
What’s Next?
The Florida meeting sharpened the choice: phase two can be built as a staged, verifiable transition—or it can become a stand-off where each side demands the other concede first.
If phase two advances, it will do so through mechanics rather than slogans: crossings that stay open, administrators who can actually run services, and an international security mandate that is strong enough to matter but limited enough to attract contributors.
If it stalls, the warning signs will be equally practical: tightened access, delayed governance appointments, an international force stuck in concept papers, and a widening gap between what leaders promise and what changes on the ground.
