Infantino Is Losing Allies — Now UEFA Wants To End His FIFA Reign
UEFA Has Turned Infantino’s Retreat Into A Fight For FIFA
Infantino’s Support Network Begins To Collapse
Gianni Infantino abandoned his plan to sell a stake in FIFA’s most valuable competitions, but the retreat has failed to contain the political damage. What began as a dispute over the commercial future of the World Cup is rapidly becoming a fight over whether Infantino should continue leading world football.
Wales has formally withdrawn its support for his 2027 re-election campaign, while England is expected to do the same. UEFA has declared that FIFA’s current leadership has lost its confidence, demanded the preservation of documents connected to the proposal and left open the possibility of legal, regulatory or arbitration proceedings.
The Retreat That Failed To End The Crisis
FIFA Forward Enterprise was presented as a way to unlock more money for football development. The proposal involved establishing a commercial subsidiary responsible for competitions including the World Cup and selling approximately 20 per cent of it to private investors, potentially raising as much as $4.2 billion from a business valued at around $20 billion.
Infantino argued that the investment could fund more pitches, stronger national teams, women’s football and development programmes across FIFA’s 211 member associations. The plan was particularly attractive to smaller federations that rely heavily on FIFA funding and possess little independent commercial income.
However, the proposal triggered immediate resistance over ownership, governance and the prospect of private investors gaining an economic interest in future World Cup profits. UEFA’s 55 associations unanimously rejected it and threatened to withdraw from FIFA competitions if it proceeded.
CONCACAF, representing North and Central America and the Caribbean, also opposed the project. The Asian Football Confederation subsequently demanded proper consultation, while senior figures inside FIFA publicly questioned how the proposal had been developed and communicated.
Infantino eventually announced that the project would not proceed because it had created divisions that were no longer compatible with FIFA’s stated objective of uniting football. That decision removed the immediate threat to the World Cup, but it did not answer the deeper questions about who designed the proposal, who knew about it and why associations were placed under such intense pressure to approve it.
Why UEFA Is So Powerful
UEFA is formally only one of FIFA’s six continental confederations, but economically and competitively it is the most powerful organisation beneath FIFA itself. It represents 55 national associations and controls the European Championship, Champions League, Europa League, Conference League and Nations League.
Those competitions place UEFA at the centre of the world’s richest football market. European clubs employ most of the game’s leading players, dominate international broadcasting and sponsorship, and provide much of the talent responsible for making the World Cup commercially valuable.
UEFA generated more than €5 billion during the 2024–25 season and redistributed approximately €3.9 billion directly to clubs and national associations. Its competitions are not peripheral products within world football; they are the financial engine of the global club game.
That gives UEFA power which cannot be measured by votes alone. A rebellion involving major European national teams, leagues, clubs, broadcasters and sponsors could damage the sporting credibility and commercial value of almost any FIFA project.
Its boycott threat demonstrated that power with unusual clarity. FIFA could theoretically organise competitions without European participation, but a World Cup missing countries such as England, France, Germany, Spain, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands would be diminished almost beyond recognition.
The strongest players would also be placed in an impossible position if their clubs, national associations and FIFA issued conflicting instructions. Even without a match being cancelled, the risk of institutional chaos was sufficient to make the investment proposal commercially toxic.
Europe’s Influence Extends Beyond Its 55 Votes
FIFA’s democratic structure is designed to prevent Europe from controlling world football by itself. Every member association receives one vote, meaning England has the same formal voting power as a much smaller football nation.
UEFA therefore holds 55 of FIFA’s 211 votes. It cannot elect or remove a president without attracting substantial support from Africa, Asia, the Americas and Oceania.
Yet 55 united associations remain an enormously powerful starting bloc. Under FIFA’s statutes, one fifth of the membership can demand an extraordinary congress. That threshold is 43 associations, meaning UEFA possesses enough members to force a formal gathering without assistance from another confederation.
An extraordinary congress would not automatically remove Infantino. It could, however, force the leadership dispute onto a defined agenda, test his support through resolutions and make it much harder for associations to avoid declaring where they stand.
UEFA’s real strength lies in its ability to convert commercial leverage into political momentum. Once CONCACAF and the Asian Football Confederation challenged the proposal, the dispute ceased to be a straightforward confrontation between Europe and the rest of the world.
However, statements issued by confederations should not be confused with guaranteed votes from every national association they represent. Individual federations vote in FIFA presidential elections, and many have financial, political and strategic reasons to maintain their relationship with Infantino.
Why UEFA Is Also Criticised
UEFA’s intervention does not make it an uncontroversial defender of football. It is itself an immensely wealthy commercial organisation whose authority has repeatedly been challenged by clubs, leagues and courts.
Critics argue that UEFA’s revenue-distribution system reinforces the dominance of established Champions League clubs. Of the €3.317 billion available for participating clubs in the 2025–26 season, approximately 74 per cent was allocated to the Champions League and Super Cup, leaving smaller competitions and non-elite clubs with much less.
Repeated qualification can create a self-reinforcing cycle in which already powerful clubs receive larger payments, buy stronger players and become even more likely to qualify again. Smaller clubs have consequently demanded a greater share of European competition revenue and stronger rewards for developing players who eventually reach the elite.
UEFA has also faced scrutiny over the combination of its regulatory and commercial roles. It creates the rules governing European competitions while simultaneously operating the most lucrative of those competitions itself.
In the European Super League case, the European Court of Justice found that the previous FIFA and UEFA rules governing the approval of rival competitions were unlawful because their powers were not constrained by sufficiently transparent, objective, non-discriminatory and proportionate criteria.
That judgment did not approve the original Super League project. It did, however, reinforce the argument that UEFA cannot simply present every defence of its own authority as a defence of the wider game.
There is therefore an element of institutional self-interest in its campaign against FIFA Forward Enterprise. Private ownership of a FIFA competition business could have strengthened FIFA’s commercial position and created a more aggressive competitor to UEFA’s own tournament empire.
Nevertheless, UEFA’s commercial interests do not invalidate its governance objections. There is an important distinction between selling broadcasting and sponsorship rights for a limited period and transferring an ownership stake in the business controlling competitions to permanent outside investors.
The central question is not whether UEFA makes money from football. It is whether FIFA was preparing to give private capital a direct financial interest in competitions built by national associations, players and supporters without adequate consultation or transparent safeguards.
How Much Support Does Infantino Still Have?
Infantino entered this crisis from an apparently commanding position. More than 200 associations were reported to have endorsed his re-election before the sell-off controversy erupted, leaving little prospect of a credible challenger.
The first formal withdrawals therefore matter symbolically, but they do not yet demonstrate that he has lost a majority. Wales and England turning against him could begin a wider sequence, although dozens more associations would need to follow before his defeat became likely.
Infantino’s strongest defence is the funding FIFA distributes beyond Europe. He can argue that his presidency has transformed the organisation’s finances and provided countries with infrastructure, development programmes and opportunities previously concentrated within football’s wealthiest regions.
FIFA says its development investment will reach $2.7 billion during the 2027–30 cycle. Infantino has also emphasised that all 211 associations possess equal standing and that the commercial success of the World Cup should benefit countries which cannot generate UEFA-style revenues themselves.
That message carries genuine political weight. African, Asian, Caribbean and Pacific associations may dislike the handling of the investment proposal without concluding that UEFA should determine who leads FIFA.
South America is particularly important. CONMEBOL had unanimously backed Infantino’s re-election, while his political relationships across Africa have helped sustain his authority during earlier disputes with Europe.
The opposition must therefore offer more than anger. It needs a candidate capable of persuading smaller federations that changing FIFA’s president would not mean reducing development payments or restoring European control over the organisation.
What Happens Next?
The immediate battle will concern evidence and accountability. UEFA’s lawyers have demanded that relevant documents and electronic communications be preserved, increasing pressure on FIFA to explain how the proposed subsidiary, investor negotiations and financial incentives were developed.
Document preservation does not prove misconduct, and the abandoned proposal was not inherently unlawful simply because it was controversial. It does mean that UEFA is preparing for a process extending beyond public statements and political criticism.
Further associations are likely to review their endorsements. Each withdrawal would make it easier for others to follow, particularly if national governments, supporters and domestic leagues intensify pressure on football officials.
The decisive deadline is 18 November 2026, when presidential nominations are due. A challenger needs the support of at least five member associations, a modest procedural threshold but a much harder political undertaking if the candidate is to defeat an incumbent controlling FIFA’s global funding relationships.
The election is scheduled for 18 March 2027 in Rabat. If more than one candidate stands, Infantino will ultimately need a majority of valid votes once the contest has narrowed to two candidates.
UEFA could seek an extraordinary congress before then because its 55 associations exceed the 43 needed to demand one. That would give the opposition a platform to pursue governance reforms, request explanations or attempt to demonstrate that Infantino no longer commands the confidence required to govern effectively.
An early removal remains considerably harder than forcing a meeting. Unless FIFA’s internal institutions act, a decisive legal finding emerges or Infantino resigns, the presidential election remains the clearest route to replacing him.
Infantino is therefore wounded, not defeated. His proposal collapsed because UEFA converted outrage into a credible threat, but his presidency will survive unless that temporary coalition becomes a cross-continental electoral movement.
The next withdrawals will reveal whether this is still primarily a European rebellion or the beginning of a global realignment. If UEFA can unite dissatisfaction across several confederations behind a credible alternative, Infantino could face the first genuinely dangerous election of his presidency; if it cannot, he may survive the greatest retreat of his tenure and emerge knowing that even his most powerful opponents were unable to remove him.
