Venezuela’s Interim Presidency After the U.S. Detention: Who Controls the State, the Oil, and the Next 72 Hours
Venezuela’s interim president Delcy Rodríguez faces a 72-hour test of control
As of January 4, 2026, Venezuela is operating in a rare and volatile gray zone: the head of state is in U.S. custody, the country’s highest court has ordered an interim transfer of presidential powers, and senior officials are publicly insisting the detained president still defines the government’s legitimacy.
The Supreme Court’s move is designed to keep the machinery of the state running under constitutional language about “forced absence,” while also framing the crisis as a sovereignty test rather than a succession fight. At the same time, ministers and security officials are projecting unity and continuity, signalling they intend to govern as if the leadership core remains intact.
This is not just a story about personalities, speeches, or who appears on television. It is a story about control of institutions and systems that cannot pause: the armed forces, the interior security apparatus, the oil revenue pipeline, the central bank and payments network, and the ports, pipelines, and export terminals that convert barrels into cash.
The story turns on whether Venezuela’s institutions treat the interim order as a bridge to continuity—or as the start of a break in control.
Key Points
Venezuela’s Supreme Court ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the presidency on an interim basis, explicitly citing continuity during the president’s “forced absence” after detention by U.S. forces.
The ruling signals a follow-on legal debate about the framework needed to sustain state functions and sovereignty while the president remains detained.
Interim officials have publicly claimed unity behind the detained president, a message aimed at preventing fractures inside the state and security apparatus.
In practice, “real control” will be decided less by legal language than by who can command security forces, keep ministries functioning, and secure revenue flows—especially oil.
The next 72 hours are defined by a small set of triggers: signals of military cohesion, control of key economic nodes, public order dynamics, and international recognition choices.
Background
Venezuela’s immediate crisis began with a U.S. operation that detained President Nicolás Maduro and transferred him to U.S. custody, with U.S. officials indicating he is to face criminal proceedings in New York. Venezuela’s government has characterized the detention as a kidnapping and an assault on sovereignty, while U.S. officials have framed the action as a law-enforcement mission tied to long-running allegations of narco-terrorism and organized crime.
In response, Venezuela’s Supreme Court ordered Vice President Delcy Rodríguez to assume the office of president on an interim basis. The court’s language is built around continuity: the state must keep operating, and the government must present a unified front while sovereignty is contested. The same ruling indicates the court expects a legal debate to define the applicable framework for governance during the president’s “forced absence.”
This dovetails with a known constitutional structure. Under the Venezuelan constitution’s provisions on temporary presidential absence, the executive vice president can replace the president for a limited period, with extensions tied to legislative resolution and potential escalation into a debate about whether the absence becomes “permanent.” That distinction matters because it determines what comes next: a time-limited caretaker arrangement, or a pathway toward a formal replacement process.
Delcy Rodríguez is not a neutral caretaker figure. She holds multiple portfolios and has been central to economic and oil management. She is also closely tied to the existing power structure, including the legislature’s leadership through her brother, Jorge Rodríguez, who heads the National Assembly. That makes her well-positioned to run the administrative state quickly, but it also links her legitimacy to the same governing coalition now under pressure.
Internationally, the split is immediate and predictable: some governments view the detention as a violation of international law and sovereignty; others see it as the removal of an illegitimate leader and an opening for transition. Europe’s position is shaped by both principles and pragmatism: support for democratic restoration, paired with a strong insistence that international law and the U.N. Charter remain binding constraints, especially when a Security Council member is involved.
Confirmed: Venezuela’s Supreme Court ordered Delcy Rodríguez to serve as interim president, citing continuity during the president’s forced absence.
Disputed: Whether the detention is legal under international law, and whether it can be framed as “law enforcement” while also implying political control over Venezuela.
Unknown: How long the president will remain detained, and whether any political or legal process will be recognized by Venezuelan institutions as binding.
Analysis
Political and Geopolitical Dimensions
Who holds real control tonight: law vs institutions?
The law is setting a narrative. Institutions will decide whether that narrative has force.
The Supreme Court ruling is an attempt to lock in continuity as the default setting. It signals to ministries, governors, the military high command, and state firms that the system is expected to keep moving, that payroll must be paid, that directives will continue, and that disobedience can be framed as constitutional sabotage. In a crisis, that “permission structure” matters. It lowers the threshold for officials to keep taking orders.
But “real control” is not a single switch. It is a network.
A useful power map has three layers:
Institutional legitimacy nodes
Supreme Court: provides legal cover for interim authority and defines the “absence” framework.
National Assembly leadership: can validate extensions, frame legality, and shape the next steps if absence is prolonged.
Cabinet ministries: enforce policy and manage day-to-day governance; their compliance is what makes orders real.
Security nodes
Defense Ministry and the military high command: determine whether the interim presidency is protected and obeyed nationwide.
Interior Ministry and domestic security services: control public order, protest response, and arrests.
Key installations (airports, communications hubs, power facilities): define the state’s ability to function under stress.
Revenue and payments nodes
Oil ministry and the national oil company: determine whether the state can still generate and collect export revenue.
Central bank and the domestic payments system: determine whether salaries, imports, and currency management continue.
Ports and export terminals: determine whether cargo can move and whether buyers can pay without seizure risk.
Tonight, the interim presidency has a constitutional and judicial pathway. The critical question is whether the security and revenue nodes accept it as operational authority rather than only a rhetorical shield.
The U.N. Security Council meeting scheduled for Monday adds a second clock. Venezuela and its allies will seek condemnation and restraint. The U.S. will seek to defend legality, deter pushback, and maintain pressure. For Europe, the issue is not only Venezuela. It is the precedent: if a state can be seized by force without clear international authorization, the rules-based system becomes optional.
Confirmed: The Supreme Court’s interim order is explicitly framed as continuity during forced absence and is paired with an expected legal debate.
Disputed: Competing claims about sovereignty and legality, including whether a foreign detention can be reconciled with international norms.
Unknown: Whether the interim framework will be treated as temporary continuity or becomes the foundation for a broader political transition plan.
Economic and Market Impact
What happens to oil, payments, and sanctions compliance in practice?
In the short run, uncertainty behaves like a blockade even before any formal change in sanctions.
Venezuela’s oil is the state’s financial spine. If crude exports stall, the government’s ability to pay salaries, fund subsidies, import fuel components, and keep public services functioning weakens quickly. This matters even if the government retains security cohesion, because fiscal stress raises the risk of fractures inside the coalition.
The immediate picture is already severe: U.S. enforcement has pushed Venezuelan exports toward a standstill, with shipping disruptions extending even to barrels previously moving under U.S. licensing arrangements. Storage constraints then force operational decisions on the ground. If oil cannot leave the ports, production must slow, and that ripples through refining and domestic fuel supply.
Payments and sanctions compliance follow a predictable pattern in crises:
Banks and insurers move first. Even rumors of cargo seizure or sanctions ambiguity can freeze letters of credit, delay insurance coverage, and raise the compliance bar for counterparties.
Shipping routes become political instruments. Tankers can be delayed offshore, turned around, or held in limbo while parties wait for legal clarity.
Debt-service flows become vulnerable. If a portion of shipments is tied to debt repayment arrangements, disruptions can quickly become diplomatic issues, especially with large creditors.
For Europe, the market impact is more indirect than direct. The UK and most European states are not structurally dependent on Venezuelan crude in the way the U.S. Gulf Coast refining system can be. But global oil is a single pool. If Venezuelan flows swing suddenly, the effect shows up in global pricing, freight rates, and refined product spreads. Even if ample global supply caps the price spike, volatility rises—and volatility itself has economic costs.
Confirmed: Venezuelan oil exports are under severe disruption, with operational constraints pushing production cuts as storage fills.
Disputed: Whether any near-term “normalization” of oil flows could occur under a political transition narrative, given competing claims of sovereignty and legality.
Unknown: The operational control of key revenue infrastructure over the coming days—ports, terminals, and the chain of authorization required for exports and payments.
Social and Cultural Fallout
In the first hours of regime shock, societies rarely behave like a single crowd. Fear and caution can coexist with celebration and anger, sometimes on the same street.
Public calm can be misleading. A quiet city may mean people are waiting for signals. It can also mean security forces are holding back to avoid sparking a confrontation while leadership sorts itself out. Either way, the social question is not only “will there be protests?” It is “will security respond consistently, and will the state keep basic services functioning?”
For ordinary Venezuelans, the crisis lands on familiar pressure points:
the price and availability of food staples, especially if imports are delayed;
cash access and payment reliability;
fuel supply, if refining or distribution is disrupted;
personal safety, if security posture changes overnight.
Diaspora communities in Europe are also pulled into the crisis. In cities with large Venezuelan populations, the event is both political and personal: families tracking safety back home, remittance channels, and fears of an escalating conflict that produces another outward migration wave.
Confirmed: The interim government’s public messaging emphasizes unity and continuity, a classic attempt to reduce social panic and elite fragmentation.
Disputed: Whether domestic opposition forces will treat this moment as a transition opening or as a trap that increases repression risk.
Unknown: The near-term scale of demonstrations, arrests, or emergency restrictions, and whether public order will be managed with restraint or force.
Technological and Security Implications
Security alignment is the decisive variable—and it is the hardest to verify in real time.
There are public declarations of activation and sovereignty defense. But the real signal is operational: who controls barracks and armories, who controls communications channels, who can move units without resistance, and who controls the interior-security chain of command.
Three near-term risks stand out:
Command-and-control confusion
If rival orders circulate—between interim authority, detained leadership claims, and local commanders—miscalculation becomes more likely. In fragile moments, “confusion” can create violence even when no side wants it.Infrastructure vulnerability
Energy systems, telecom networks, and payments rails can be stressed by cyberattacks, sabotage, or simply lack of maintenance under crisis conditions. Disruptions to the power grid or fuel distribution can create political effects faster than any speech.Information warfare
In a high-uncertainty environment, rumors about arrests, defections, or foreign landings can move markets and crowds. The state’s ability to communicate consistently becomes part of security management.
This is where the uncertainty checklist is most important.
Uncertain: Alignment of security forces beyond top-level statements; operational control of key ministries; control of revenue infrastructure in practice; the precise timeline and forum for any legal or political proceedings.
What Most Coverage Misses
Many headlines will frame this as a single succession question: “who is president?” That framing is emotionally satisfying and analytically weak.
The more useful frame is: who can keep the state functioning by controlling the switchboards of power—security, cashflow, and logistics.
A government can survive a legitimacy crisis for a long time if it can pay salaries, control streets, and keep fuel moving. Conversely, a government can lose control quickly if oil revenue is interrupted, if payments fail, or if the security apparatus becomes fragmented. The court ruling is not merely constitutional theater; it is an attempt to bind the bureaucracy to continuity and to make defection feel illegal rather than merely political.
The second overlooked element is the constraints-based reality of the next 72 hours. No actor can rebuild institutions in three days. They can only do a few things quickly: claim legality, seize or defend key sites, issue orders to ministries, freeze money, and attempt to shape international recognition. That is why the short-term forecast should focus less on grand plans and more on small, observable triggers.
Why This Matters
For Venezuela, the stakes are immediate: governance continuity, public order, and the ability to fund the state through oil. A prolonged standstill in exports and payments would raise the risk of fuel shortages, disrupted imports, and internal fractures.
For Europe and the UK, three issues dominate:
International law and precedent. If sovereignty norms fracture under great-power action, smaller states face higher systemic risk.
Energy and market volatility. Even if Europe does not directly rely on Venezuelan crude, global price volatility transmits into fuel costs and inflation expectations.
Migration and regional stability. Neighboring states are watching for refugee movements. Any escalation could accelerate outward flows that eventually reach Europe as secondary migration pressure.
There are also defined near-term decision points to watch:
A U.N. Security Council session on Monday, January 5, 2026, where positions and veto dynamics will clarify what multilateral action is possible.
A U.S. court appearance expected Monday, January 5, 2026, which could harden Washington’s legal framing and reduce diplomatic room for compromise.
Any explicit shift in oil enforcement posture or licensing terms, which would immediately reshape the cashflow and compliance environment.
Real-World Impact
In a Caracas neighborhood, a family that already budgets day-to-day watches the same three things: whether the local shop can restock staples, whether the card machine works, and whether fuel lines lengthen. Politics becomes a question of logistics.
In a European trading office, risk managers focus on documents rather than speeches. If cargoes are at risk of seizure or sanctions ambiguity increases, the first instinct is to pause. A pause can be rational for a firm and devastating for a state that needs cash every week.
In Madrid, a Venezuelan expatriate community tracks two clocks at once: the safety of relatives back home and the stability of remittance routes. If banking channels tighten, families feel it immediately, regardless of which flag is raised over a ministry.
In the Caribbean basin, shipping operators and port authorities treat uncertainty as hazard. Reroutes and delays cascade, and the practical question becomes whether this crisis stays political—or disrupts the basic movement of goods.
The 72-Hour Test
The next three days are a contest between consolidation and fragmentation, with only a handful of triggers that matter.
Triggers for consolidation:
If the military high command and interior-security chain of command continue to follow interim directives; if ministries keep operating without visible splits; and if oil infrastructure remains under coherent operational control, the interim government can project stability even under severe external pressure.
Triggers for instability:
If competing claims of authority produce arrests of senior figures, contested control of media and airports, or signs that regional commanders are hedging, the risk of fragmentation rises sharply. If oil cashflow collapses and domestic fuel distribution falters, social order becomes harder to manage, which further stresses security cohesion.
International recognition pathways:
Europe’s likely posture is a principles-first stance: support for democratic restoration while insisting on legality and Venezuelan self-determination. Some states may treat the interim authority as de facto for operational reasons (diplomacy, consular work, financial flows) while refusing to legitimize foreign control. Others may either align more closely with Washington’s framing or reject it outright and demand immediate reversal. Recognition will be less a single vote than a gradient of practical engagement.
Three most likely endgames—and the trigger for each:
Continuity under Delcy Rodríguez, with Maduro retained as the symbolic legitimacy anchor
Trigger: sustained security cohesion plus functioning ministries and partial economic continuity, even under oil export pressure.Elite fracture inside the governing coalition, producing competing centers of power
Trigger: public defections, rival security commands, or seizures of key installations that reveal the state no longer takes orders from one chain of command.Negotiated transition with an externally constrained timetable
Trigger: a convergence of pressure—economic strangulation, international diplomacy, and domestic political mobilization—creating incentives for a transitional deal that offers elections or a caretaker framework in exchange for sanctions relief and security guarantees.
The clearest signpost will be simple: whether the interim authority can keep the state’s switchboards—security, payments, and oil logistics—working without visible fractures by midweek.
